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Abstract
A commonly held assumption of America’s post-Cold War place in the world is that prolonged
contact with American capitalism and democracy will lead to the adoption of these systems in all
nations that participate in international trade. This paper attempts to verify or disprove that
assumption by examining a specific traded commodity between two specific nations, the
institutions that support this trade, and the people actively participating in it. The growth of
soybean exports from the state of Missouri provides this vehicle for examining the trade history
between the United States of America and China, and provides evidence that disproves the
assumption that democracy is an inevitable outcome of this trade. Through agricultural exports
data provided by the US government, past analyses of US-China trade relations, as well as
personal interviews conducted with policy and government advocates, businesspeople
experienced in US-China trade, and personal experiences participating in US-China trade, I
examine the recent history of US-China agricultural trade relations and why these did not satisfy
American foreign policy expectations of creating a democratic China. In order to do this, I have
divided the periods after which soybean trade between the United States and China began into
three periods: the period of Domestic Self-Sufficiency, the Strategic Period, and the State-Owned
Enterprise Period. Along with the relevant historical and economic background information
underlying Modernization Theory, I introduce the concept of a force in a capitalistic market that
propels a state toward democracy through private exchanges, which I term the Democratizing
Market Force (DMF). I show that, contrary to expectations, American individuals participating
in soybean exchanges with China since the early 1970s did not act primarily out of ideological
interest. Based on this case study, it is also evident that a naturally occurring Democratizing
Market Force never manifested itself in the soybean trade between Missouri and China, thus
disproving the social scientific theories about the ideologically deterministic nature of such
exchanges.
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INTRODUCTION

Two Nixons attempted to grow trade between the United States of America and China.
The first was President Richard Nixon, who in 1972 visited the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) to begin the process of opening up market exchanges between the two countries. There
followed a spectacular growth of trade, with agricultural and manufactured products exported
and imported in both directions. By 2011, the state of Missouri saw China as a key export partner
for its many agricultural commodities, most importantly soybeans, spurring Governor Jeremiah
‘Jay’ Nixon to create a trade mission that would visit the state’s sister province of Hebei.
Optimism led to conflict, however, as ideologies and political matters interfered with economic
goals. These issues only grew, and in 2018 a Trade War began between the United States and the
People’s Republic of China that has yet to be resolved.
All the while, however, those who grew, processed, and exported soybeans to China, as
well as those in China who purchased them, continued pursuing their self-interests without
concern over their respective governments’ ideologies. Economic metrics, not ideologies, guided
the actions of those in the soybean industry. This means that there was no force present that
would lead to democracy in China.
Much scholarly work has been done regarding the trends and greater forces at work as
nations industrialized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The seeking out of
trends, and the desire to universalize them, is common, but especially present with such
ideologically motivated theories as Modernization Theory. Modernization Theory essentially
advocates for the existence of a universal path all nations follow toward modernity. They evolve
from a ‘traditional,’ non-industrialized state to a ‘modern,’ industrialized state with a democratic
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government in place to protect private property rights with the rule of law. Along this universal
path, nations would discover that “Westernization, industrialization, and economic growth would
generate the preconditions for the evolution of greater social equality and consequently the rise
of stable, democratic institutions.”1 In addition, any deviations, such as the embrace of
communism or an autocratic government, would be corrected, as they would lead to inferior
outcomes.2 While Modernization Theory was never explicitly stated as a foreign policy goal or
doctrine of the United States, to Western scholars, officials, and everyday individuals in the West
by the end of the twentieth century, “democracy was increasingly viewed as a universal principal
to which all could aspire.”3 Since such historical concepts as Modernization Theory advocate for
an inevitable outcome resistant to the effects of human agency, they are described as
‘deterministic.’ This universalism of democracy led to the creation of significant contradictions
within Modernization Theory, which is a common failure of most deterministic theories.
Marxist perspectives of historical analysis that focus on the intersection between material
exchanges and human behavior touch on this as well, while diminishing the impact of nonmaterial pursuits. In this way, this paper is a Marxist paper. It focuses on the material, and how
material exchanges do not intersect with ideologies without intentional effort. Modernization
Theory attempts to make a strictly material basis for the evolution of what could potentially be
considered ideologically based aspects of civilizations, such as the supposed superiority of
democracy versus autocracy, and communism versus capitalism. This paper continues the long-

Kevin E. Davis and Michael J. Trebilcock, “The Relationship between Law and Development:
Optimists versus Skeptics,” The American Journal of Comparative Law 56, no. 4 (Fall, 2008):
900.
2 Davis and Trebilcock, “The Relationship between Law and Development: Optimists versus
Skeptics,” 900.
3 Robert W. Strayer and Eric Nelson, Ways of the World: A Brief Global History (Boston:
Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016), 1000.
1
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standing analysis of the ideological versus the material, as well as the agency versus trends and
forces studies seen throughout history, by framing its arguments strictly in the realm of material,
self-interest-motivated, rational exchanges, which reveal the ideological biases of Modernization
Theory that are responsible for its flaws.
The author interviewed several experienced professionals and public servants for this
paper. The author was also a participant in several of the main events featured in this paper.
Statistics and trade data provided by government and NGO sources are used to corroborate the
information provided in these interviews and experiences, while journal writing, books, official
policies, and statements from political leaders are used to examine the broader trends and
ideological perspectives of the time period. The goal of this paper is to take the broader historical
trends discussion and analyze it on the individual level, to see if these trends are at all present in
the actions of individuals. Specifically, those who trade in soybeans between Missouri and China
are thought by social scientists to act a certain way and to create a certain outcome. That such an
outcome has yet to occur means that, perhaps, these trade participants acted in a different way
than expected, and that the theories are flawed. With this experiment, the author hopes to elevate
the impact of individual agency, and the stubbornness of humanity to avoid sticking to
predictable trends.
The first chapter is dedicated to providing an historical framework. A brief history of
China’s Communist Party rule after World War Two is provided, along with a history of soybean
farming in the United States, as well as the history of trade between the US and China following
the opening up of trade in 1972. In chapter two, the ideologies and concepts at work within this
history are presented. The first are the economic rationales for globalized trade, including
discussions of self-interest and the concept of value as defined by modern economists and
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business decision-makers. The ideology of Modernization Theory, its origins and philosophies, is
then presented, along with the introduction of the Democratizing Market Force thought to be
present according to Modernization Theorists.
The actual history of soybean trade between the US and China is then presented in three
parts, framed according to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strategy. This is because the
CCP actually had a strategy, and one that visibly changed in the sources, and the US did not.
Chapter three presents the history of the Domestic Self-Sufficiency Period, when China
reluctantly purchased soybeans to keep its population fed while attempting to eliminate the need
for future agricultural imports. Chapter four shows how the CCP shifted to a Strategic Period,
where they abandoned efforts to eliminate all agricultural imports and chose soybeans instead of
corn as their grain import of choice in order to minimize strategic threats and maintain a food
supply for its more affluent population, while the US sought to integrate its market with China
more and more, educating Chinese buyers about hog-feed operations without thought to anything
other than increased sales. In chapter five, China’s shift to favoring State-Owned Enterprises,
which are for-profit businesses owned by the Chinese government, is discussed in The SOE
Period, with the challenges of CCP policies and conflicts with US ideology and trade leading to
the 2018 Trade War and present-day challenges. In chapter six, a retrospective of this history is
used to form the conclusion that China’s actions deviated from the supposedly inevitable path
proposed by Modernization Theory, and that a Democratizing Market Force was not present in
the US-China soybean trade. The consequences of social scientists’ failure to perceive this are
presented, as well as justifications for why China did not become a democracy. Chapter seven
concludes with a summary of the discussion, along with a warning against placing an ideological
burden upon non-ideologically motivated actors.

4

The concept of the Democratizing Market Force did not occur in isolation, but was the
product of several decades of economic theory and historical context. This historical context was
always seen through a US and Western-based lens, disavowing alternative economic theories and
cultural contexts. The dominance of the US, especially following the Cold War and the adoption
of the Washington Consensus model of economics and globalization under the World Trade
Organization (WTO), contributed to the belief in the underlying principles of the DMF and
Modernization Theory.
Many scholars have written about the origins of the soybean and its growth as a
worldwide crop. The plant was first cultivated in northern China, and only became a widespread
US crop in the twentieth century, where, before World War One, they “were grown almost
exclusively for hay and forage.”4 It was primarily during World War Two that the US soybean
industry grew to significant size. The US needed glycerin to produce nitroglycerin for its war
munitions, and one of the primary ways to acquire this valuable commodity was through
processing palm and coconut oil. These oils had been used to produce margarine and other food
products before, but the US needed to preserve these oils for the production of glycerin. Soybean
oil was identified as a suitable oil alternative, and government support and encouragement led to
widespread cultivation of the crop. With this government-led change in the market, the
government was successful in acquiring sufficient tropical oils for munitions, while “consumers
were urged to save waste oils and fats for recycling and farmers were encouraged by price
supports to plant more oilseeds such as soybeans.”5

Harry D. Fornari, “The Big Change: Cotton to Soybeans,” Agricultural History 53, no. 1 (Jan.,
1979): 246.
5 Ernst Langthaler, “The Soy Paradox: The Western Nutrition Transition Revisited, 1950-2010,”
Global Environment 11, no. 1 (Nov., 2018): 10.
4
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In addition to the subsidies and the strong market, farmers soon found that soybeans
served as a solid rotational crop that would rejuvenate the soil and make it easier for future corn
plantings. Paul Burke, Senior Director of U.S. Soy Marketing at the Soybean Export Council, is
a key expert on understanding both how soybeans are exported to China as well as how farmers
operate within their globalized supply chain. His goal is to maximize volume, yields, and returns
for farmers, and he has a long period of success in doing so. But he is not necessarily a soybean
fanatic—he is a farmer fanatic. He understands that farmers are interested in whatever crop will
give them a greater economic return, be it soybeans or something else. In his experience, farmers
“love to grow corn because the volume of corn you can get per acre is so much higher than all
other commodities. But after you click the corn bucket, you’re looking at cotton, wheat, or soy”6
in order to prepare the soil for another corn crop. And so, soybeans were not only a good crop
themselves, with lots of government encouragement and support, they enabled the more
profitable corn crop, all of which contributed to the widespread adoption of soybean farming in
the US.
In China, cultivation of soybeans in Manchuria had been common for centuries, and it is
considered to have originated in the Manchuria area. The crop’s trade and availability became a
diplomatic point of contention between Japanese and Russian occupiers for several decades
during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but whether it was warlords, invaders,
“Chinese contribution to Manchurian development,”7 or western imperialists, soybean
cultivation in Manchuria has continued without interruption to the present day. With the rise of

Paul Burke (Senior Director, U.S. Soy Marketing at Soybean Export Council) in discussion
with the author, September 2020.
7 David Wolff, “Bean There: Toward a Soy-Based History of Northeast Asia,” The South
Atlantic Quarterly 99, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 247.
6
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the Chinese Communist Party, soybean cultivation became a part of the state-directed economy,
subject to the myriad changes, reforms, setbacks, and improvements of the early Mao era.
When the People’s Republic of China expelled Chiang Kai-shek’s forces and solidified
control of China in 1949, the CCP set about creating its ideologically driven economic structure.
Chairman Mao Zedong’s concept of Marxism-Leninism, which focused on class restructuring of
the means of production, became the “theoretical basis guiding”8 CCP policy. Land reform,
specifically the breaking up of large privately owned landholdings, became a top priority, as did
the rapid industrialization of China. Mao was driven to both prove that his ideology was
effective, and to establish China as a modern, industrialized, militarily powerful state. All of this
led to Mao’s and the CCP’s Great Leap Forward from 1958-1962, with disastrous results. The
state confiscated the property of feudal-style landlords, forbid any private ownership of land, and
farmers were divided into People’s Communes. No one could farm for personal use or have a
private garden, and, notably, the private raising of pigs was forbidden. By the end of 1956, “only
3.7 percent of rural households remained independent”9 of collectivized farms.
This collectivization was expected to yield higher agricultural results. However, since the
collective efforts were also collectively rewarded, individual incentives to produce results
disappeared, and poorly executed improvements to drainage and irrigation did not create
improved yields. In fact, yields went down. The Great Leap Forward’s industrial efforts, focused
on heavy machinery and steel production, also took huge numbers of farmers out of the fields.
Focusing on quotas rather than quality, outdoor furnaces attempted to melt cooking implements,

Mao Tse-Tung, Quotations from Mao Tse Tung, ed. Brian Baggins and David Quentin (Pattern
Books, 2020), 1.
9 Wei Li and Dennis Tao Yang. “The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central Planning
Disaster.” Journal of Political Economy 113, no. 4 (Aug., 2005): 845.
8
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which were deemed unnecessary as farmers were fed in people’s kitchens, into pig iron to be
used for industrial purposes. These burned enormous amounts of lumber, required many labor
hours, and since the fires could never get hot enough and the metal they produced cracked too
easily, all this effort effectively transformed formerly useful metal objects “into something
totally useless.”10 Administrators attempting to prove their loyalty by raising their quotas made
the situation worse. Reporting accurate numbers of declining results was punished, and party
members failed to report policy failures “out of fear of being labeled a right deviationist.”11 This,
along with a drought, resulted in the starvation deaths of tens of millions of Chinese citizens,
turning the Great Leap Forward into what became known as the Great Famine. It would be many
years before the failures of the Great Leap Forward were corrected, and Mao’s ideological purity
would allow for any deviation from a failing execution of Marxism-Leninism.
Early on, due to its ideological unity, the People’s Republic of China relied upon its
fellow communist ally, the USSR. However, border disputes and disagreements over technology
sharing and support soon disrupted this alliance. “Disillusioned by the experience of leaning too
much on trade with other Communist nations, Peking shifted in the early 1960’s to a policy of
“self-reliance.””12 China was willing to look for any support it could find in this regard, even if it
was from an ideological enemy. The split with the USSR convinced China “to put aside
ideology, to contemplate at least temporary compromise on Taiwan, and to turn to new relations
with the United States”13 in order to not only protect China from Soviet interference, but to

R. Keith Schoppa, Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History
(New York: Routledge, 2020), 316.
11 Yang Jisheng, Tombstone (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2008), 32.
12 S. H. Chou, “The Pattern of China’s Trade,” Current History 75, no. 439 (Sept, 1978): 65.
13 Evelyn Goh, “Nixon, Kissinger, and the “Soviet Card” in the U.S. Opening to China, 19711974,” Diplomatic History 29, no. 3 (Jun., 2005): 476.
10
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acquire new technology and opportunities for industrial growth. The Cold War between the US
and the USSR led then US President Richard Nixon to pursue this new relationship with China,
mostly “to tip the balance in its dealings with the Soviet Union.”14 This strategy ultimately
succeeded, as did China’s. Soybeans joined the myriad other products the two nations exchanged
from the very beginning.15 Flashpoints of history are evident in the volume of soybean exports,
and trends found within this data reveal insights into the changing nature of the relationship
between the two countries. The United States, and the state of Missouri, thus became linked with
China through the soybean market.
Trade with the US did not stop Mao from continuing his ideologically driven
authoritarianism. Nixon’s 1972 trip to China coincided with Mao’s Cultural Revolution, an effort
Mao launched in 1966 to prevent “his brand of Communism”16 from degenerating, but which
also ensured Mao’s continued authoritarian rule. Ideological purity in the form of loyalty to Mao
and his vision for China purged a great deal of leaders from the government, and led to many
deaths and economic disruptions. Mao was certainly willing to express pragmatism in geopolitics
in order to support China’s self-sufficiency and growth. But it wasn’t until his death in 1976 that
a more economic and ideological pragmatism formed in China itself.
Deng Xiaoping, who had been a party leader under Mao and who faced persecution
during the Cultural Revolution, used his political connections and clear vision for China to
overcome Mao’s successors and rise to supreme authority in the CCP in 1978.17 He could plainly
see the failures of Mao’s regime. His series of reforms, known as the Four Modernizations, did

John Bryan Starr, “Sino-American Relations,” Current History 87, no. 530 (Sept., 1988): 302.
“Global Agricultural Trade System,” United States Department of Agriculture Foreign
Agricultural Service, accessed August 24, 2020. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx.
16 Roderick MacFarquhar, “Mao’s Last Revolution,” Foreign Affairs 45, no. 1 (Oct., 1966): 112.
17 Schoppa, Revolution and its Past: Identities and Change in Modern Chinese History, 350.
14
15
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not concern themselves with ideology. Instead, he urged CCP leaders to “emancipate our minds,
use our heads, seek truth from facts and unite as one in looking to the future”18 in order to carry
out the four modernizations of agriculture, science and technology, national defense, and
industry. China would find what worked, regardless of its source. Deng called this form of
economic pragmatism “socialism with Chinese Characteristics.”19 Whatever it was called, it led
to economic liberalization. Farms were de-collectivized, with the private raising of crops,
including the raising of pigs, once more allowed and even encouraged. Market and individual
incentives soon drove improvements in China’s economy. Democracy, considered the “Fifth
Modernization”20 by many reformers in China, was thought to be an inevitable aspect of this
economic growth. However, despite rejecting Mao’s ideological narrow-mindedness, Deng
maintained Mao’s practice of authoritarian control, going so far as to kill hundreds, if not
thousands, of protesters during the 1989 protests for democracy in Tiananmen Square.21 Still,
Deng maintained his economic liberalization as communism failed worldwide in the breakup of
the Soviet Union. Many scholars tied these forces of capitalism with the forces of democracy,
and came to believe strongly in their inevitable power to shape nation-states.
During this time period, the US faced its own domestic and geopolitical challenges as it
underwent many societal changes in the latter half of the twentieth century, all while it struggled
to win the Cold War with its version of a capitalistic democracy against the Soviet Union’s
communist authoritarianism. The historical record during the Cold War shows that change
occurred through human agency, whether it was through Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Deng’s

Janet Chen, Pei-Kai Cheng, Michael Lestz and Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern
China (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2014), 494.
19 Rai Singh, “Chinese Brand of Socialism,” India Quarterly 58, no. 1 (Jan.-Mar., 2002): 181.
20 Chen, Cheng, Lestz and Spence, The Search for Modern China, 497.
21 Chen, Cheng, Lestz and Spence, The Search for Modern China, 560.
18
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Four Modernizations, or even President Johnson’s Great Society. It also showed how human
agency could stop change. However, the path of change occurred within the context of larger
historical, and economic, trends. Modernization Theory derived itself from the supposition that
these larger forces are stronger than any individual act of agency. Upon closer inspection,
whether it was Nixon choosing to open up trade relations, Mao choosing to ignore the failures of
his policies, or Deng doing the opposite, individual agency had a tremendous impact. This
complication of individual agency can be translated all the way down to the individual
businessperson trading soybeans and disrupting any Democratizing Market Force.

11

THE DEMOCRATIZING MARKET FORCE

Economic and social scientific theory progressed in parallel with much of the historical
changes of the twentieth century. In many ways, they fed each other, with economic success
driving the many changes seen in the historical record, and the historical record of success
justifying the proposed economic theories. These economic theories not only guided
policymakers, they were also the bedrock of understanding taught in US business schools. Rather
than informing economic actors, however, these theories examined existing behavior and
justified it, meaning that a businessperson was expected to act according to these theories even if
they were unaware of them. When these economic theories merged with analyses of historical
trends, however, social scientists continued this too-distant perspective to make leaps of
judgement that led to the creation of Modernization Theory and the Democratizing Market
Force. Western Economics is far more rigid in its analysis of human behavior than social
scientists’ modeling, due to its reliance on the concept of rationality versus irrationality. The
silent, historically forgotten impact of millions of individual acts of self-interest could potentially
counteract any force intending to stop it, but that self-interest lacks a universalism that is
required to create a Democratizing Market Force.

The Invisible Hand
Much scholarly work has been written regarding Adam Smith’s original theory on the
Invisible Hand of the market. The basic concept is that market force incentives of self-interest
encourage ethical behavior. For instance, if a farmer were to sell tainted soybeans, their
customers would buy from an alternative supplier that did not sell tainted soybeans, incentivizing
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the farmer toward ensuring food safety or risk going out of business from a loss of sales. This
businessman is thus “led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. Nor is it always the worse for the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own
interest, he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it.”22 Self-interest, therefore, creates ethical outcomes. Regardless of the veracity of
this theory when applied to real events, the concept of the Invisible Hand has become a
commonly held notion in business circles and government actors. It has guided US policy in both
domestic and international economic affairs so much that “any interference with free market
forces is interpreted as an attack on the paramount value of freedom because it restricts the
ability to trade.”23 The purpose of this paper is not to prove or disprove the realism of this theory,
but rather to examine the role of the belief in the Invisible Hand in government liberalization.

Self-Interest
Self-interest is the guiding principle behind value-added exchanges, and the basis of
capitalism. It also intersects with the basic understanding of the Invisible Hand. Firstly, value can
be defined as the difference between what one must provide in exchange for something they
desire. In other words, it’s the difference between what you ‘give’ and what you ‘get.’ A valueadded exchange can be defined as an exchange that leaves the two parties in such an exchange
with more value than they previously possessed.24 For example, a soybean farmer uses their land,

Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, Volume I,
(Hertfordshire, England: Wordsworth Editions, 2013), 237.
23 Shannon Kathleen O’Byrne, “Economic Justice and Global Trade: An Analysis of the
Libertarian Foundations of the Free Trade Paradigm,” The American Journal of Economics and
Sociology 55, no. 1 (Jan., 1996): 12.
24 Harvey S. James Jr. and Farhad Rassekh, “Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical
Society,” Business Ethics Quarterly 10, no. 3 (Jul., 2000): 665.
22
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labor, capital, and entrepreneurism to produce soybeans. The soybean farmer then sells the
soybeans to a baker who comes to the farm. The baker has produced bread using their own land,
labor, capital, and entrepreneurism, and has sold it to make money. They then use this money to
purchase soybeans. The farmer values the money they receive for the soybeans more than the
soybeans because the farmer is more efficiently capable of producing soybeans than they are at
producing the other things they desire, such as bread. The baker similarly is more efficient at
producing bread than they are at producing soybeans. In this specific exchange, the baker values
the soybeans more than they value the money they must give up in exchange for the soybeans.
And so, the baker ‘gives’ money and ‘gets’ soybeans while the farmer ‘gives’ soybeans and
‘gets’ money. Both parties depart the exchange with more valuable items than they had before,
and when this process happens systematically across a tremendous number of transactions, the
total value of the system as a whole increases. This is the basic concept of how wealth is created
in a capitalistic economy.
Both the farmer and the baker are driven by self-interest, and this governs their
interpretation of the value in the exchange. Both parties seek to maximize the value they receive
in the exchange, meaning they want to ‘give’ less and ‘get’ more. However, both parties must
agree to the terms of the exchange without coercion in order for the exchange to take place,
otherwise it is not a free market exchange.25 If, for instance, the farmer asks too high a price for
the soybeans, the baker may refuse to buy them. This is because at a certain price, the baker does
not value the soybeans more than they value their money, which can be used to make alternative
purchases. The same is true in reverse for the farmer. If the baker asks for too low of a price, the
farmer will refuse, and withhold selling their soybeans until they find a buyer who offers an

25

James and Rassekh, “Smith, Friedman, and Self-Interest in Ethical Society,” 668.
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amount of money they value more than the soybeans. The same is true when examining
Missouri’s exports of soybeans. Farmers sell to wholesalers according to a market price. A
farmer might, however, place their soybeans in storage to await a better price. Or, if they
anticipate a low price, they might plant an alternative crop, such as corn or wheat, or even allow
their field to be used for the growing of hay grass and the grazing of cattle.
The choice of what to plant, how much to sell, and at what price, are all decisions based
on the self-interest of the farmer, who chooses the highest valuable alternative, i.e., the option
that requires them to ‘give’ the least and ‘get’ the most. This is not a system which requires any
directive from an outside entity, and in fact ceases to function efficiently and effectively in the
presence of coercion.26 All that the farmer requires is the knowledge of what option will bring
them the greatest value. When the farmer chooses to do so, it is said that they are acting
rationally. There is nothing, however, preventing the farmer from making a lower-value choice,
such as accepting a lower price than they could potentially receive, or planting an alternative
crop that would bring a lesser return. Therefore, participants in such exchanges are capable of
exercising agency, in that they have the freedom to decide their course of action. However,
according to modern economists, to choose the lower-value alternative is said to be irrational,
and that “rational agents will drive the irrational agents from the market because the former
make higher profits.” 27 In this way, while participants in economic exchanges have agency, their
actions are not unpredictable.
Since participants in value-added exchanges will seek out the highest value alternative, if
this highest value alternative is known to social scientists, they would expect participants to
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make this decision. Otherwise, the participant is acting irrationally. An irrational participant is
expected to quickly “learn from their mistakes”28 and adjust. For instance, if a farmer accepted
too low a price for their soybeans and saw other farmers get more money for their crop, they
would adjust, out of self-interest, and make a more rational choice in the future. This is because
it is to their personal benefit to act rationally. To act irrationally would be to their own detriment.
In this way, social scientists and economists may be able to analyze what systems lead to
superior and inferior outcomes, and expect a common trend to appear, since they expect all
participants to act rationally in their own self-interest.
If the self-interest of the Invisible Hand can be considered a force that directs such
actions, it can be considered a natural one, since it does not require active human decisionmaking to enforce. The concept of a natural force, in this context, refers to the idea of rationality.
A rational actor in an economy would respond to incentives and be expected to behave a certain
way. For instance, if it cost more to manufacture in one country over another, a rational
economic actor would choose to operate in the country with the lower costs. No external actor is
compelling this actor to make this decision. It is a reaction to something that exists without
human effort, and therefore can be considered ‘natural.’ If an economic actor required external
pressure from another actor, then that could be characterized as ‘unnatural.’ This is a way of
comparing the concept of the free market to the concept of the state-directed economy. In a statedirected, or command economy, individuals acting according to their own individual agency
direct economic actors. In a market economy, economic actors respond to the marketplace,
which is guided by actors responding to rational incentives. In this way, a definition of a
‘natural’ force can be crafted. First, it is a force that does not require human agency to be shaped.
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A market could be considered the results of thousands of individual, rational actors, but on an
individual level it is considered a faceless force. Still, this force determines “the equilibrium in a
market with many agents.”29 In order to better complete the definition, then, a ‘natural’ economic
force could be defined as something that triggers a common response for a rational economic
actor. In other words, any rational participants in the market would respond the same way to the
market’s circumstances. Such a faceless force that can only be responded to, but never shaped, is
the concept of a natural force that underpins the rationality of Modernization Theory.

Justifications for Globalized Trade
Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, not only proposes the concept of the Invisible
Hand as a self-interest-guided force of morality, he also includes a justification for why nations
trade with one another. This is called the Theory of Absolute Advantage,30 and can be illustrated
by comparing the productive forces of two different nations. For example, suppose France is
capable of using one unit of labor to produce thirty units of wine and one unit of labor to produce
two units of machinery. Germany, meanwhile, is capable of using one unit of labor to produce
twenty units of wine and three units of machinery. The total labor used is four units, the total
wine produced is fifty units, and the total machinery produced is five units. Smith proposes that
both nations should specialize in the production of the good for which they have an absolute
advantage. Therefore, France should now use two units of labor to produce sixty units of wine,
and expend no units of labor in the production of machinery. Germany should also specialize,
and use zero units of labor in the production of wine, and two units of labor in the production of
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six units of machinery. France will then trade thirty units of wine for three units of machinery,
leaving both nations with thirty units of wine and three units of machinery.31 The total labor used
is still four units, however the total wine produced is now sixty units, and the total machinery
produced is now six units. Self-interested nations, therefore, should specialize in what they have
an absolute advantage in, and trade for the things they do not.
Subsequent economists have modified Smith’s original theory, with Ricardo’s Theory of
Comparative Advantage, suggesting that even if a nation has an absolute advantage in everything
they produce, they should still specialize in the production of items for which they have a
comparative advantage in and trade for the rest.32 This helps to justify why China purchases
soybeans from the US even though they also produce soybeans domestically. The US could be
argued to have a comparative advantage in soybean farming, while China has a comparable
advantage in low-cost manufacturing, which is why China buys and produces soybeans and the
US buys and produces manufacturing capacity, to the mutual economic benefit of both countries.
The Theory of Factor Endowment further explains why nations trade by “equating factors
embodied in net trade to excess factor endowments,”33 such as one nation having more land, a
more educated labor pool, more available capital, or better-rewarded entrepreneurs than another.
Michael Porter’s Cluster Theory further expanded this reasoning by stating that the specialization
of trading nations “promotes clusters of competitive industries,”34 because when industries
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cluster, they tend to attract more industries, due to the advantage of a concentrated supply base,
labor pool, and knowledge base amongst the participants.
All of these justifications came to the same conclusion: that international trade is a
rational exercise by economic actors seeking the greatest value in an exchange. In many ways,
however, they were all later justifications for how individuals already behaved. Smith explained
why he saw nations trading with one another. His concepts likely encouraged the growth of
international trade, but he did not invent it. The same is true with Ricardo’s theory, and the
Factor Endowment Theory was also a way of answering the question of why nations traded, not
encouraging them to do so or inventing the concept. And it was after international trade took off
following the success of the United States during World War Two that economists like Porter not
only justified this growth in trade, but contributed to an orthodoxy of how nations were supposed
to behave.

Modernization Theory
Modernization Theory is linked to Smith’s Invisible Hand in that both assume behavioral
changes based on rational economic incentives. The United States became the primary model for
the creation of Modernization Theory, since “eras in which economic expansion has delivered
ongoing material benefits to the majority of the country’s population have mostly corresponded
to eras when opportunities and freedoms have broadened, political institutions have become
more democratic, and the treatment of society’s unfortunates has become more generous.”35
Since communism has been shown to produce poorer long-term economic outcomes, such as less
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GDP growth, inferior consumer product quality and availability, comparatively fewer
technological innovations, and overall inferior living standards,36 it was theorized that the natural
incentives of self-interest would inevitably lead all nations toward capitalism. This foundational
belief of Modernization Theory has guided US foreign and domestic policy.37 But what separates
Modernization Theory from the Invisible Hand is its application of these incentives to the
government itself, not just the economy.
Modernization Theory came about following World War Two, with a similar timeframe
as the Bretton-Woods Conference and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The
Bretton-Woods Conference was a meeting of world leaders in 1944, where the basic principles
of post-war trade were ironed out. Central to this principle was the agreement to “set up a
machinery for international co-operation, but limit its scope to co-operation in respect of
international payments and the international value of the means of payments.”38 This evolved
into the GATT, which created rules “focused on safeguarding the tariff concessions, i.e.,
reductions or bindings, negotiated between its signatories,”39 with tariff reductions becoming the
basis of free market economic neoliberalism. Tariffs are a tax on an imported good. Since they
are often used to protect domestic industries by making competitive imports artificially more
expensive, they are considered anti-competitive and anti-free market to Bretton-Woods free
market economists.
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While economists examined operational efficiency to elevate models and theories that
maximized it, Modernization Theorists examined economics and industrialization from a social
science perspective. Poorer nations rapidly began to industrialize following World War Two,
including China. Modernization Theorists rose following previous schools of thought that saw
societal advancement as sharing a common pattern. The theory has several deterministic
elements, although the theory is not itself wholly deterministic.
According to Modernization Theory, a nation followed a general pattern that led, broadly,
from a deindustrialized, or traditional, economy to an industrialized, or modern, one. It saw
modern societies as the result of humans responding to natural incentives, which meant that
“underdeveloped societies would have to undergo the same process of evolution from
traditionalism to modernity previously experienced by more developed societies.”40
Modernization Theory does not allow for the possibility that the end result of modernization is a
socialist state. Its core concept is that an industrialized society creates greater wealth than an
unindustrialized, “traditional,” society, so a society will respond to the wealth incentives of this
advancement and industrialize. Since “de-centralized market economies have had a proven
record of delivering rising living standards over sustained periods of time,”41 a society will also
evolve in the direction of capitalism.
In tandem with this is the proposal that democracy also creates superior economic
outcomes within a capitalistic society by protecting private property rights through a separate
executive and judiciary that focuses on enforcing the rule of law. Therefore, a society will evolve
in that direction as well. A “modern” society is, therefore, one that utilizes a capitalistic
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economic system of private wealth generation reinforced with the rule of law featured in a
liberalized democracy. By universalizing this evolution from traditionalism to free market
democratic capitalism, Modernization Theorists propose a link between democracy and
capitalism, and “a mechanism by which the connection between the two might indeed be
causal.”42
At the time of Modernization Theory’s development, alternative semi-deterministic
theories were already in circulation. Karl Marx theorized that structures of power situated in
different classes “consisted in the development of class antagonisms”43 that would inevitably
lead to revolution. Ownership of the means of production by the state, and therefore the
dictatorship of the working class, called the proletariat, would be the inevitable result of the
ruling class’s oppression of the working class. Marxism, and the Marxist-Leninist philosophies
of central planning that came from it, served as a Cold War-era alternative to Modernization
Theory, and in the early twentieth century “the open question was whether central planning or a
de centralized private market could better deliver efficient production of goods and services.”44
Both Marxism and Modernization Theory imply the presence of a natural force in historical
advancement. For Marxism, it was class conflict. For Modernization Theory, it was rational
responses to self-interest incentives.
Neither theory achieved a monopoly of supporters during the Cold War era. Being a
comparatively younger historical theory, the widespread embrace of Modernization Theory
principles really took off with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the breakup of the Soviet Union in
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1991. Its proponents seemed emboldened by the supposed proof of their theory, as “traditional
Communist societies committed to both one-party political systems and centrally planned
economies have suddenly become a rare species,”45 and proposed that the end of the Cold War
was an inevitability, and that Russia, once the home of Marxism in action, was following the
pattern of all other industrialized, modern societies.
Modernization Theorist social scientists could possibly be compared to Whig Historians,
in that they saw a common pattern of development. Whig historians, or “Whiggish” historians, as
they came to be known, saw European nations evolving to a state of modernization as well, by
“dividing the world into the friends and enemies of progress,”46 with a focus on how
Protestantism led to parliamentarianism and liberty and Catholicism did the opposite. It was a
flawed, and completely self-congratulatory historiographical theory that served mostly to praise
the history and government of Great Britain, and has become synonymous with such types of
historical analysis. To call Modernization Theory ‘Whiggish’ would not be an unfair statement.
Both Whig Historians and Modernization Theory-promoting social scientists proposed a
common pattern of development that considered their own society to be at the pinnacle of this
development.
Thus far, however, all these theories have focused on economics, not ideology. To claim
that a democracy is superior to an autocracy would either require an ideological stance or an
economic one. An ideological stance that advocates for concepts of personal liberty requires
cultural contexts, and therefore is a subjective means of comparison. Economic outcomes,
however, are simply numbers, and therefore objective. And so to measure one society against
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another as either modern or not, economic metrics provide a more scientific basis than
ideological ones.
Modernization Theory does not make an ideological argument in favor of democracy. It
states that a democracy allows for greater individual self-determination, and that strong courts
and individual rights that protect private property encourage greater economic outcomes for the
individual, which, as a whole, leads to greater economic outcomes for the state. Under an
autocracy, individual choice and initiative are diminished, and since wealth is not protected,
there is less of it, which means that “at least some elements of what is normally meant by
democracy are not just consequences of rising living standards but also key preconditions to the
form of economic organization that makes sustained increases in living standards possible.”47
Therefore, rational nations will inevitably alter their governments to become more and more
democratic, and will eventually become fully liberalized democracies. The greatest evidence for
the veracity of this theory is in the fall of the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union broke up, the
“apparent triumph of the market economy and democratic polity”48 was seen not only as a
triumph of the democratic capitalistic system, but as an inevitable outcome.
This change is not theorized to be instantaneous, or even guided by decisions that cause
visible change. Instead, Modernization Theory proposes that the market causes gradual changes
over time. It might take time for a farmer to see the failure of their tainted soybeans in the
marketplace, or they might be reluctant to invest time and money into making changes. They
would have to purchase cleaning supplies, change their storage methods, and potentially retrain
laborers. But these things must be done, otherwise the farmer will lose so much business that
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they can no longer compete. The same is true, in theory, regarding a nation and democracy, since
social scientists have found “empirical support for a positive linear relationship between levels of
economic development and democracy in a system.”49
Governments and elites might be reluctant to give up their absolute autocratic power. But
with democratic, capitalistic nations competing for global resources and wealth, autocratic
nations will have no choice but to democratize or they will lose their ability to create wealth as
the capitalist nations gain a greater and greater share of supplier and consumer markets. None of
this requires explicit action on the part of government actors. In fact, many economists and
policymakers believed that reactions to market incentives and “improvements in living standards
would inevitably and naturally lead to liberal political systems.”50 The market will naturally
create the most profit, and the most profitable suppliers will be those who make decisions that
most benefit the customer, and this itself is naturally self-sustaining. The same is considered to
be true for an autocracy becoming a democracy. No revolution is required. Incalculable selfinterested incentive-based decisions will dismantle an autocracy and inevitably lead to
democracy by a force that is both natural and sustainable.
Much scholarly work has been written to dismantle the deterministic flaws of
Modernization Theory. However, “the ideas linger in foreign policy circles.”51 These ideas orient
around the idea that the market is a natural force that drives human behavior. The concept that
the market is a great natural force that guides decision-making, that government interference will
lead to inferior economic outcomes, the promotion of “private property rights, economic
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opening, financial reforms, macroeconomic stability, and political liberalization to promote
economic growth,”52 has become so widespread it has come to be known as the Washington
Consensus. It is visible in institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which
replaced the GATT, and the World Bank, which offers loans to governments under the condition
that government interference, such as tariffs meant to protect domestic industries, be limited, as
well as limiting “certain types of domestic legal arrangements on the theory that they constitute
disguised barriers to trade.”53 The effectiveness of markets and market incentives in altering
behavior has also guided much policy and theory toward China. China had been gradually
liberalizing its economy since the late 1970s. Modernization Theory states that, just as the Soviet
Union gradually liberalized its economy and faced democratic liberalization shortly thereafter,
China will also inevitably become democratic. The self-interest of the Invisible Hand, therefore,
not only touches economic activity, it touches governments as well.

The Democratizing Market Force
No metaphor exists to describe the incentivized move toward democracy proposed by
Modernization Theory. The concept of the Invisible Hand is assumed to apply. However, its
inventor, Adam Smith, drew a clear line between an economy of individuals and the government
that rules them, and “was notoriously suspicious of the efforts of lawgivers to influence
norms.”54 We will, therefore, leave the Invisible Hand solely in the economic realm, as its
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creator intended, and instead address the self-interest incentives that will supposedly inevitably
lead an autocratic government toward democracy. Modernization Theory proposes that this is a
natural force, that it requires no explicit action, that it will occur through myriad incentivized
decisions from countless individual actors seeking to satisfy their self-interest. To separate it
from the Invisible Hand and concepts of self-interest, I will call this supposedly natural force the
Democratizing Market Force, or DMF. The DMF assumes that continued economic contact
between nations will inevitably lead to democratic liberalization. Its key feature is not that
democracy is seen as desirable or superior, but that it is inevitable. Actions taken to prevent
democratic liberalization are seen as merely delaying an unavoidable outcome. However, the
DMF is not driving toward political liberalization arbitrarily. The idea revolves around the
principle that democracy creates superior economic outcomes, and therefore a nation will shift
towards democracy through rational economic actors acting in their own self-interest.
While self-interest could be said to be the energy behind the DMF, they, like the Invisible
Hand, are not the same. Most economists would consider self-interest to be unrelated to
ideology. In fact, avoiding ideological conflict is considered preferable to the rational economic
actor.55 Self-interest is simply the recognition of a rational economic actor choosing the most
beneficial option when making economic decisions. In this way, if creating an autocracy creates
superior economic outcomes, it would be rational for a nation to do so. Modernization Theorists
claim that such a society produces inferior outcomes, though, so only an irrational nation would
choose to do so. This irrational nation would then see their rational competitors, nations who
have adopted democracy, out-compete them, or would be overwhelmed by their superior
competitors, and choose to act rationally either to achieve greater outcomes or to avoid negative
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outcomes. Therefore, self-interest drives a nation toward becoming a democracy. But this
requires a definition of self-interest contained within the mindset of the Washington Consensus.
It is culturally linked to Enlightenment ideas, such as individualism and personal liberty. Selfinterest, however, is not so simple.
Compare two individuals who are each given $100. One person invests their money in
the stock market, gaining a high rate of return. The other person uses it to buy an expensive
dinner. The first person is left with more money than they started, while the second is left with
nothing. However, each can be said to have acted according to their own self-interest. The first
person valued the increased wealth they received in investing, while the second person valued
the enjoyment derived from a nice dinner more than they valued any future wealth they might
have gained from investing. Just because one party is left with no money does not mean that they
acted irrationally.
In this extremely simplified example, we can see how different definitions of self-interest
can drastically alter the decisions of rational economic actors. The concept of value is itself
subjective. The value of a dinner versus investment returns is entirely subjective according to the
personal preferences, risk tolerance, the demographics of the persons, etc., in the exchange. If
self-interest is defined as making decisions to maximize value, then those decisions will
themselves require significant context in order to be identified as rational or irrational.
Economists have evolved their understanding of self-interest and rationality due to the fact that
many market conditions are “heterogeneous with regard to rationality.”56 The investor who
already has significant wealth but never spends any money and starves can be said to be
irrational because they are not acting according to their own self-interest. And the person who
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needs to pay $100 to a bank to prevent their farm from being foreclosed on would be irrational if
they splurged on an expensive dinner and chose to lose their farm. But even these might require
further context in order to make judgements of rationality versus irrationality. Humans are
complicated creatures, within and across cultures, and understanding self-interest requires an
understanding of these complexities.
The idea that self-interest will always lead to democracy is simply not true. A dictator is
self-interested in maintaining their dictatorship if a democracy will vote them out of office or
have them arrested. A criminal is self-interested in maintaining a corrupt system in order to avoid
prosecution. Modernization Theorists propose that these individual cases of self-interest are
insufficient to overcome the combined effects of the self-interested push toward democracy, as
traditional economists propose that acts of irrationality are so rare that they “more or less cancel
out at the aggregate level.”57 However, just because there are fewer of these examples does not
mean these actors are not acting according to self-interest. The idea that the power of the selfinterest of those who benefit from democratization is superior to the power of the self-interest of
those who would benefit from maintaining autocracy is a bedrock concept of Modernization
Theory. But it makes self-interest too all-encompassing a term to apply to this force. And so, the
DMF is not just self-interest, it is not just rationality, it is the collected force of self-interested
rational actors, and one that is supposedly more powerful than all other forms of self-interested
rational actors, powerful enough that its success is considered inevitable. This creates a
disconnect, incorrectly putting self-interest on a single, inevitable trajectory regardless of
economic context based only on past historical trends. This is why the DMF is its own force, and
not the same as self-interest.
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Whether it is seen as a balm against setbacks58 or as a justification for continuing existing
policy decisions,59 the idea that trade with the US will inevitably lead to China becoming a
democracy has influenced the trade policies of many US government actors and NGOs. Its
proponents exist to this day, one of whom is the former governor of Missouri, Bob Holden.
Holden was governor of the state of Missouri between 2001 and 2005, during the critical time in
which China first became a WTO member. He was an early advocate for cultural communication
between the US and China, and since leaving office has become the CEO of the United States
Heartland China Association, which is a “bipartisan organization committed to building stronger
ties between USHCA Region (20 states located in the USA between the Great Lakes to the Gulf)
and the People’s Republic of China.”60 A democrat from the southern portion of Missouri,
Governor Holden has a lot of experience with, and concern for, Missouri farmers. He grew up in
rural Missouri, and spent his youth collecting and selling wild black walnuts to pay for things
like baseball gloves.61 His story is as red-blooded American as they come, and his philosophy on
China is shared amongst many Americans.
As governor of a US state, Holden was responsible for promoting trade policies and
business opportunities within his state, but, perhaps more significantly, his status gave him
significant authority to advocate for certain policy positions. His policy position was then, and is
now, that both Missouri and China benefit from open, non-hostile interactions, and that
democracy is “going to happen in degrees,”62 meaning that all that is required for China to
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become a democracy is time. If this were true, it would be evidence of the Democratizing Market
Force in action. The key to this force is not that it is good or bad, or that it even acknowledges its
own moral basis. Holden is not an idealist, nor does he come across as naïve. His philosophy in
dealing with China is just as seemingly pragmatic, and seemingly logical, as Modernization
Theory itself. He sees mutual benefit to a long-term relationship, with cultural gives and takes,
and that it is in China’s “own self-interest to have that long-term, stable relationship.”63
Self-interest, therefore, is the energy behind the DMF, but it is a specific, singular
application of self-interest, one that disavows any alternative outcome. Modernization Theorists
align with this perspective, and explicitly caution against exercising agency in shaping a
developing nation, a policy with which the former governor agrees. Holden certainly seems to
believe that China becoming a democracy, and more culturally linked with the US and the West,
is a good thing, but he cautions that “you don’t change China by demanding that China change,
you change China by letting young Chinese see the value and importance of what we bring to the
table.”64 Recent actions, and the history of the soybean trade between the US and China,
however, reveals this belief to be as deterministically flawed as Modernization Theory itself.
To say that a businessperson is a victim of larger forces, lacking in agency, eliminates
their ability to act in self-interest. And if they lack the ability to act in self-interest, how can they
contribute to a DMF that requires democratization as a result of self-interested actions? Either
businesspeople are victims of forces that lead them to propel the DMF, or they have the ability to
act according to a self-interest that sometimes leads them away from democratization.
Modernization Theory ignores this contradiction and puts businesspeople in the dual role of
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agency-possessing seekers of self-interest and agent-less victims of historical trends. A
businessperson must see democracy as being in their own self-interest in order to be motivated
by economic rationality to embrace democracy, otherwise they are motivated by ideology, which
is not present in Modernization Theory and the DMF, and not present in self-interested economic
trade. The history of the soybean trade between Missouri and China reveals neither ideological
actors, nor actors who see democracy as always in their self-interest.

32

THE DOMESTIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY PERIOD (1972-1991)

Between 1972 and the end of the Cold War, since the US had other priorities, namely
containing and combatting the Soviet Union, and since its foreign policy towards CCP-ruled
China was focused primarily on increasing trade, changes in Chinese policy provide a more
visible framework with which to discuss the history of the soybean trade between Missouri and
China. Chinese priorities also changed dramatically during three separate periods, based on the
success or failure of these policies. In the first period, China’s priorities existed largely outside
the influence of the United States, which was allowed to develop its own theories and concepts
while doing its best to grow sales. Throughout this period, two priorities are clear: first, that
China never wavered in its desire for development. Second, that US farmers and businesspeople
never wavered in their desire to sell more goods to China. These priorities intersected, but they
did not address democracy.

China’s Agriculture First Policy
Policy mistakes of the Great Leap Forward were “the direct cause of the Great Famine”65
that allowed millions of Chinese to unnecessarily starve to death between 1959 and 1961. This
means that there was great pressure on China’s leadership to ensure their people were fed. The
horrors of the Great Famine revealed the scale of the challenge China’s government faced in
feeding its people while converting their agrarian economy to a modern industrial one. But the
risk of over-reliance on imports put China in what many considered to be a worse peril: reliance
on outsiders. One ideology in China trumped even communism, that of “self-reliance with a
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minimum dependence on foreign supplies for “strategic” needs.”66 This became especially true
after the breakup of China’s alliance with the Soviet Union and the opening up of trade with the
United States. But China’s initial goals during this period were not to import agricultural
commodities from Western nations. Its primary goal was “the importation of Western capital and
Western technology.”67 It hoped that these materials, and the insights gained from their use,
would grow China’s fledgling industrial economy, and lead its agricultural industry to eventually
become self-sufficient. Thus, China’s goal was to only import commodities like soybeans when
absolutely necessary, while promoting policies that would encourage larger crops that would
eliminate the need for such imports.
Chinese leaders boasted that China had an Agriculture First policy during the entirety of
the Domestic Self-Sufficiency Period. Critics both inside and outside of China have pointed out
that in execution, “more lip service than real support has been paid to this policy.”68 However,
the idea of Agriculture First was pushed in many speeches and policy statements as an
ideological goal, if not one that existed in practical reality. Crop yields remained unreliable, and
the “disappearance of farmland”69 became a worsening problem during this period. Some
improvements were made, and yields and farm industrialization made moderate growth.70
However, several policies diminished potential gains. Price controls were considered to be a
major drawback to growth. The CCP’s “efforts to keep urban prices low”71 to ensure that
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industrial workers had reasonably priced food dis-incentivized farmers and increased production
costs. In addition, while party leaders boasted about putting agricultural independence as a
priority, the government continued to export huge amounts of its domestic grain production.
With its industries still underdeveloped, rice became one of the few products for which
China could find an export market. The imports of high-tech materials and technologies required
a significant amount of money, which meant Chinese domestic policy encouraged larger and
larger rice crops to fund these purchases. Exports can certainly be used to spur economic
development and create jobs over the long-term. However, during this period, the CCP’s primary
goal for exports was “to finance necessary imports rather than to augment employment or the
growth of the domestic economy.”72 This meant that “production of crops that competed with”73
export rice, such as soybeans, suffered. And when domestic supplies did not meet domestic
demand, China reluctantly had to purchase soybeans for import from the US.
In this period, the pork industry in China remained largely unindustrialized. Hog farming
was done as it had been in China for centuries, and its methods were not terribly different from
those in the West. Pigs were raised one or two at a time as part of family farms, and were fed
food scraps. The pig was seen as a symbiotic part of a multi-crop household farm, meant “to eat
up the rice hulls, the soy bean refuse, and wastes from the household and at the same time
provide manure to build up the soil and furnish meat for food.”74 Collectivization policies,
however, had diminished many farmers’ ability to raise pigs. The nature of hog farming in
China, done on a small, individual farmer scale was “considered competitive with collective
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work.”75 Like grain commodities, pork supply constantly struggled to meet demand, even after
Deng’s reforms once more allowed pigs to be raised on private farms. The shocks of the Great
Leap Forward not only had lingering effects on China’s agricultural capacity, but Deng’s reforms
in the late 1970s still struggled to create the results demanded for agricultural independence. The
practice of feeding soybeans to hogs on a large scale did not exist in China at this time.

Missouri’s Farm Industrialization
As part of the overall trend of industrialization and urbanization in the twentieth century,
the population of farmers in the United States and in the state of Missouri gradually declined.
But while the number of farmers declined, the amount of land that was farmed remained largely
unchanged. Instead, the twentieth century saw “a fairly rapid increase in the average size of
farms”76 worked by fewer people with industrialized equipment. Chemical fertilizers and
pesticides allowed for greater yields, and soon the United States found itself with a significant
surplus of farm commodities. Soybeans fit this trend.

Soybean Farming in Missouri
Soybean farming in the US grew primarily as a replacement for other plant oil products
during World War Two, and only later became an integral part of grain and meat supply chains.
Soybeans are rarely eaten by themselves, due to their unpleasant flavor. Unripe soybeans,
referred to as edamame, were not popular in the early twentieth century, and even today are a
microscopic portion of the total soybean harvest, the remaining of which must be processed in
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order to be palatable.77 Once the soybeans are harvested, they are typically taken either to
crushing facilities or to large collection grain elevators. Crushers, as they are typically referred
to, crush the oil-rich soybeans in order to separate the oils from the solids.78 Once the process is
complete, the oils are collected and sold for everything from cosmetic products to margarine and
cooking oil, or for a myriad of other food and non-food uses.
The solids, referred to as meal or cake, are a protein and mineral-rich compound. The
cake has been used as a fertilizer, but chemical fertilizers are cheaper and more effective, and the
high protein-per-gram characteristic of the soybean meal makes it an attractive animal feed,
which has become its primary use.79 Crushers will sell the meal to feed companies, who sell it to
cattle ranchers and hog farmers. There are several crushing facilities in the state of Missouri, and
the state has a long history of hog farming and cattle ranching. Soybeans collected in elevators
are often bound for export. In the state of Missouri, this usually happens at silos along the
Missouri or Mississippi Rivers. The soybeans are mixed in the silos with soybeans from
surrounding states, with Illinois producing a larger crop than Missouri and Iowa producing a
significant amount as well. Barges then transport the collected soybeans and deliver them down
the Mississippi River to New Orleans, where they are loaded onto dry-bulk ships and transported
across the ocean.
The state of Missouri has a significant agricultural economy, and therefore has multiple
agencies and specialists to research, promote, and support agricultural commodity production.
Much of this is overseen by the Missouri Department of Agriculture. John Hensley is a
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Marketing Specialist at the Missouri Department of Agriculture, and serves to promote and find
markets for Missouri’s agricultural commodities. He is a combination of promoter, cheerleader,
and salesperson, all of which requires a significant amount of knowledge regarding the
operations of Missouri soybean farmers. In his observation, “the vast majority of US exports of
soybeans to China are in bulk cargoes,”80 primarily for livestock feed, especially for pigs.
Soybeans bound for China pass through the Panama Canal and continue west, where they are
unloaded at various port facilities, including in Northern China, where soybean processing has a
long history. This process has gone largely unchanged in the time period of this thesis. The only
key difference is the scale.
The soybean’s natural advantages, as well as Missouri’s unique geography, soon made it
a popular crop. University researchers, using government-funded grants, discovered ideal
cultivars and educated farmers on how soybeans could replenish the soil between crops of corn.
Corn can damage soil, and leaving fields empty to replenish had become common practice.
Instead of having an empty field, a farmer could plant soybeans in between corn plantings and
achieve the same replenishing results but with a sellable commodity. Once enterprising farmers
and university researchers spread the word about how this was done, and farmers saw how much
money could be made while still making money planting and selling corn, soybeans were rapidly
adopted as a common farm staple. The US government also guaranteed strong prices for farmers
in order to encourage a stable food supply. In short, the soybean became “a major crop in the
United States through Government Policy, a critical wartime need for vegetable oils, and the
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initiative of a small group of pioneers.”81 Exports were not an initial priority, but this eventually
changed.
The conditions which led to widespread soybean plantings also created a surplus of the
crop, allowing for large exports. Exports of many other US farm commodities, including corn
and wheat, soon became common, and US agricultural personnel knew that in order to sell more
US commodities, they had to create markets for those commodities, especially as US farm
capacity far exceeded domestic demand. So while agricultural experts helped encourage the
growth of the soybean crop, similar experts sought international markets for it to be sold.
One such expert is John Hagler, former Missouri Director of Agriculture and strong
advocate for Missouri farm commodities. Your typical Missouri cattle rancher, John is a
strikingly tall, lean man who is rarely seen without his cowboy hat. On a 2011 governorsponsored Missouri trade mission to China that attempted to gain more markets for Missouri
farmers, John and the governor’s delegation took a site-seeing trip to the Great Wall of China.
John reluctantly found himself a more intriguing tourist attraction though, as domestic tourists
who spotted the tall, cowboy-hatted Missouri farmer standing on the wall found him far more
interesting than the wall itself, and constantly hounded him for pictures. John’s passion for sales
and new markets, however, never deterred him from seeking out partners, regardless of any
shared cultural affinity, and he saw opportunity in China. He didn’t care where they sold,
because “farmers are looking for markets and we were starting to liberalize relations with China
in terms of trade, so therefore it was an easy sell”82 to seek out soybean buyers in China.
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Hog Farming in Missouri
Hog farming in Missouri began rapidly changing in the 1970s. The concept of the family
pig went away as economies of scale encouraged larger herds. The farm itself also changed. The
farmer now had much, much more land to cultivate in order to turn a profit, which left little time
for other activities such as raising a few pigs. Like in other industries, specialization replaced the
diverse array of products that used to be common on farms. Pig rearing used to be an easy
addition to a grain farm, like having a vegetable garden, but “by 1980, hog production was no
longer considered a part-time job, but instead a committed business.”83 University research also
helped the development of Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations (CAFO). Disease and the
challenge of waste disposal required much research, and successful techniques were shared and
encouraged by private entrepreneurs as well as NGO and university researchers. CAFO hog
farming could not be sustained by household food scraps, and animal feed has always been a
concern for the cost-conscious farmer. The return on investment in terms of pounds of feed
compared with the resulting pounds of animal protein, referred to as yield, was significantly
higher with soybean meal than other animal feed products, such as corn. This meant that “no
longer were hogs fed the garbage or leftovers of former years; in fact this became forbidden by
CAFOs.”84 While CAFO techniques were still relatively in their infancy in this time, standards
were being identified and feed techniques were being discovered that would lead to rapid growth
in the industry and create a symbiotic market for soybeans.

A History through Export Data
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The year after US President Richard Nixon and Chairman Mao opened up trade between
the US and China in 1972, China purchased a sizable volume of soybeans. Some years it
purchased more, sometimes less, and sometimes none at all. Missouri export data was not
disaggregated from the national data until 2007, and even this data is unreliable. Much of the
data comes from federal agencies, who collect data at the port of export or by the exporter, which
for Missouri soybeans occurs in the Port of New Orleans, where combining crops from various
states in the same ship makes it difficult to identify specific origins.85 This data is collected in the
Global Agricultural Trade System (GATS) databanks, and is available online (see Table 1).
The export volume for 1973-1974 demonstrates both China’s goodwill in opening trade
with the US, and the fact that soybeans were satisfying a significant need within China. Chinese
farmers still did not produce enough volume to meet China’s domestic needs. Therefore, if China
“imported anything in the 70s and 80s it was because they actually had a need or they had a
shortage.”86 Some years, however, they imported no amount of soybeans from the US. This
reflects China’s continued desire to pursue agricultural independence and eliminate agricultural
imports, and their repeated failure to do so.
In the 1970s, poor harvests and drought caused a global food crisis. Industrialized
farming techniques and chemical fertilizers allowed the US to create a surplus of grain, and the
US began to see itself as a global grain supplier. China purchased grain from the US to overcome
the deficiencies in their own supply, but their commitment to the Agriculture First Policy shows
a reluctance by CCP leaders to commit to any long-term international trade or international
organization, regardless of the crisis. Hence the many years of zero US soybean imports.
Discussions were held at the World Food Conference of 1974, where “all delegations,
85
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Table 1. GATS Data of Value of US Soybean Exports in Thousands of US Dollars (1967-1991)87
Year
Value
1967

0

1968

0

1969

0

1970

0

1971

0

1972

0

1973

43,365

1974

126,519

1975

8

1976

0

1977

14,386

1978

15,300

1979

106,722

1980

155,191

1981

129,708

1982

63,225

1983

0

1984

0

1985

12,564

1986

25,407

1987

85,895

1988

0

1989

0

1990

0

1991

0

“Global Agricultural Trade System,” United States Department of Agriculture Foreign
Agricultural Service, accessed August 24, 2020. https://apps.fas.usda.gov/gats/default.aspx.
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with the exception of China, had agreed that in order to bolster food security a grain reserve was
of central importance.”88 When the US launched a grain embargo against the Soviet Union in
1980 in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, China purchased a significantly larger
quantity of soybeans. US farmers lost an important market in the embargo, though. The Soviet
Union had suffered under the global food shortage, and supply chain deficiencies kept the
Soviets from taking advantage of their union’s sizable quantities of arable land, so they had been
purchasing large volumes of US soybeans. With the loss of such demand, even if it was created
by state actions, the market for soybeans fell, creating a much more attractive price point that
China clearly took advantage of in the comparatively high import numbers of 1979-1982. All US
soybean imports to China ceased in 1983, though, when the embargo ended and prices stabilized.
Between 1983 and 1992, China constantly played catch up with its own reforms. Deng’s
efforts to create “socialism with Chinese characteristics” remained in full-swing, and his efforts
were bearing economic fruit. Farms started to rapidly decollectivize. Industry in general shifted
to private ownership, and the pursuit of profit was no longer deemed unacceptable, and in many
ways was encouraged.89 However, conservatives within the CCP constantly pushed back against
Deng’s rejection of Maoist economics. Deng pushed through various stages of “serious
leadership dissension”90 to gain and continue to preserve an uncontestable grip on policy, and
managed to placate critics with evidence of China’s economic advancement and his willingness
to preserve CCP rule, especially following his crackdown of the Democracy Wall movement.
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In 1978-1979, protestors hung up posters in Tiananmen Square calling for the “Fifth
Modernization”91 of democracy, attempting to push for multiparty democracy in China. Deng
had defended the movement “publicly in its early stages,”92 but his unwillingness to share power
included both the masses as well as party leadership, and so the leaders of the movement were
arrested. Still, GDP grew, industrial output grew, as did agricultural yields, and Deng aligned
himself with these as proof of the validity of his Four Reforms movement’s success, while seeing
no need for a fifth reform.
Conservatives’ pushback within the CCP does not seem to have motivated Deng to do
anything more than prove them wrong. Still, it is quite evident that Deng fell in line with the
Maoists when it came to political policy, even if he went in a completely different direction
economically. Any lingering fears CCP conservatives might have had regarding Deng’s embrace
of the fifth modernization of democracy disappeared during the crackdown of protestors at
Tiananmen Square in 1989. There, student protestors sought to resurrect the Democracy Wall
movement, and even declared a hunger strike to try and convince CCP leadership to open a
dialog for democratic reform. Even though the protestors saw themselves as “a patriotic and
democratic student movement,”93 Deng dismissed them as disturbers of the peace. After using
the military to disperse the protestors, killing a significant number of students in the process,
Deng justified his actions by declaring that the students had sought to “overthrow the Communist
Party and topple the socialist system.”94 Deng proved himself to be ruthlessly willing to hold
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onto power, and to keep others from touching it, while maintaining a strict pragmatism regarding
economic policy.
Deng’s economic reforms in the soybean market, however, didn’t immediately shift from
a state-sponsored command economy to a market-driven one, and there appears to have been
some reluctance to make this radical of a shift. China’s “continued reliance on nonprice solutions
to address a price problem”95 never seemed to create a stable supply or lead in any way to the
goal of agricultural independence. Price controls on China’s domestic soybean market were
changed, curtailed, enforced, and changed again as the success or failure of such policies became
evident.
As Deng’s economic reforms continued to create significant growth in China’s economy,
and as private property and the pursuit of profit grew, China’s demand for pork began to grow,
which created the need for more hogs and more feed for hogs. When China’s economy grew, key
products went up in price as demand went up and people had more money to spend. However,
“the supply of pork lagged far behind the demand.”96 Price controls and state policies prevented
the domestic market from reacting quickly enough to these market signals, which required
varying amounts of imports to make up the difference. Sometimes crops were excellent, and
sometimes they were not. In many cases, agricultural reforms led to improvements, but Deng’s
goal remained “to prevent growing dependence on imports.”97 Gradual reform and gradual
growth, with quick fixes of imports or expenditures to ease the transition, were China’s guiding
principle, and the soybean import data reflects this policy.
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The GATS data reflects historical events and policies, rather than market conditions. It is
forgivable for Washington Consensus advocates to connect market incentives with Deng’s
market liberalization policies in China. It is possible that market incentives are responsible for
such changes. However, government actions in both China and the US played a highly
significant role. This is reflected in this data, and the trends of the next period reflect an entirely
different strategy in China.
With the Soviet Union still present as a strategic and ideological adversary, it is possible
to examine this period through a strictly ideological lens. However, ideology did not motivate
either party. China sought growth, and US businesspeople sought markets. Ideological
compromises on the part of Mao in allowing his communist nation to trade with the West, and
Deng’s near abandonment of Marxist-Leninist economics could lead to the conclusion that China
compromised while the US pushed its ideology. But this is an oversimplification. China’s policy
never wavered during this period, even if its ideology did. The same was true of the US. This
reveals the remarkable resilience of CCP leaders to focus on the greater goal, and the lack of an
ideological motivation on the part of individual US businesspeople.
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THE STRATEGIC PERIOD (1992-2004)

As China’s economy grew, it grew in complexity. A new policy needed to be enacted to
maintain China’s ultimate goal of full industrialization and growth. US economic policy also
grew in complexity, as the fall of the Soviet Union dissolved nearly every barrier to international
trade and led to new opportunities for businesspeople. The US’s ideology seemed to have
succeeded and required no action beyond allowing what had already toppled communism to
continue, while China actively sought ways to ensure its growth. As contacts grew, trade
between the US and China did as well. Meanwhile, not only did US partners not advocate for
democracy in China, it was considered a wiser course of action to explicitly choose not to do so.
Deng’s reforms and economic liberalization had provided irrefutable dividends by the
1990s. The fall of the Soviet Union had also proven two things: first, the failure of MarxismLeninism as an efficient system of economics. Second, that it was not just economic failures that
had brought down Russia’s communist party. Even Modernization Theorists admit that “old
fashioned nationalism”98 among satellite states and non-Russian regions, as well as glasnost, the
Soviet Union’s policy of being more open about its history and policies, played an important
role. Seeing how their state compared to the west, and how “they were falling ever farther behind
Western living standards,”99 disillusioned the populace, and the Soviet Union’s lack of will to
use violence to put down protestors left it vulnerable to what became successful revolutions and
uprisings. Deng no doubt witnessed, and learned from, these events. However, despite the
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violence of the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, Deng was still considered a reformer, and economic
liberalization continued in China.
While the Soviet Union fell apart and the Cold War ended, China continued to grow its
GDP and allowed for greater and greater privatization and trade. Economic reforms continued,
and Deng pushed hard to present China as a growing, fair trading partner that the world could do
business with. In order to solidify this, he saw membership in the World Trade Organization
(WTO) as the ultimate goal. China finally achieved membership in the WTO in 2001, after it had
“pulled out all the stops to realise this great Dengian ideal.”100
The WTO is the successor to the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) and
was first established in 1993. It is not just a general agreement, but an institution that “presides
over a rule-based trading system based on norms that are almost universally accepted and
respected”101 by its signatories, which now include China. The WTO serves a dual role as an
international organization for the making of trade agreements, as well as “an international
adjudicator deciding trade disputes.”102 The latter has become its most prominent, powerful role,
and has significantly impacted policy decisions of a wide variety of nations. The guiding
principle of the WTO is fair trade. That means few to no barriers, political and economic,
between any countries. Most importantly, this means eliminating tariffs, which are taxes imposed
on imports, quotas, which are limits in either dollar or quantity amounts of imports, and state
involvement in private enterprise, including state ownership and subsidies.
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The US has long been a GATT member, as well as a WTO member, despite having
policies regarding farm subsidies that the WTO finds “hardly free and fair,”103 including
subsidies for soybean farmers. These did not prevent the US from joining the WTO, however,
and countries like the US were more than willing to overlook China’s own anti-free trade
policies in order to admit them to the WTO. US President Bill Clinton personally advocated for
this, and directly linked trade with China to political liberalization in China, going so far as to
call liberty “the most contagious force in the world,”104 and arguing that trade would inevitably
create this contagion. All the while, China kept buying soybeans as domestic economic
considerations, and China’s economic policies, continued to evolve.
The evolution of the Bretton-Woods Agreement, the GATT, and the WTO seemingly
followed the same pattern of advancement as Modernization Theory. However, the economic
actors in these agreements did not include democracy, or political affairs of any kind, in these
agreements. The WTO’s own guidelines explicitly state that its legislative jurisdiction is “limited
to trade relations.”105 GATT members were not forbidden from joining based on the framework
of their governments, but on the framework of their trading policies. If a country joined the
GATT, and later the WTO, and added significant trade barriers such as quotas or tariffs, or added
significant subsidies to domestic industries, another member country affected by this policy
could raise a complaint. WTO-run courts, potentially in concert with UN-based organizations or
other NGO and privately-run arbiters, could rule between complaining parties. Thus, an
enforcement mechanism was created to ensure free trade.
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No enforcement mechanism, however, was created by the WTO to encourage the
democratic elements of an industrialized society. WTO guidelines state that its “international
tribunals are courts of limited jurisdiction; they have no power to apply law beyond their
mandate”106 of preserving free and fair trade. And so, while Bretton-Woods neoliberal
economists look like Modernization Theorists, they’re not. The WTO claims only that free-trade
economics creates the greatest wealth, but makes no claim on democracy or morality. WTObased analyses, and the institutions created by these, are strictly contained to how to efficiently
and effectively create wealth. The primary concern is reducing global trade barriers, not
encouraging democracy or the rule of law.
Modernization Theorists, however, merge the two theories. They see evidence of the
success of WTO and GATT-supported free trade-oriented democracies compared to autocracies
as proof of the symbiotic, and inevitable, causal link between the two.107 But throughout this
period, there remained a significant barrier between the economics of the WTO, and the
liberalization proposed in Modernization Theory, which meant that China, a single-party
autocracy, faced little difficulty obtaining WTO membership and in preventing the adoption of
democracy, since there was little active institutional or individual pressure to propel it in that
direction.

China’s Grain Policy
When economic reforms raised the living standards of many people in China in the
1990s, one of the first products they sought to spend their new income on was pork. China’s
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“pork supply has vastly increased vis-à-vis the population, and pork has become a commodity
potentially consumed daily,”108 even though for many it was once considered a luxury item
unattainable outside of annual festivals. Even a slight increase in overall individual annual
consumption caused massive supply chain disruptions in China’s pork industry. More demand
for pork meant more demand for hog feed. Scraps weren’t enough. An industrialized hog
industry required a reliable supply of industrialized grain feed.
After a decade of easing price controls and after several decades of failure to obtain
complete grain independence, China finally admitted defeat. Once CCP policymakers recognized
“that China’s soybean output could not keep up with the massive growth planned for the
livestock industry, the government began to liberalize the soy sector in the 1990s, allowing
imports to overtake both exports and domestic production.”109 This change in grain policy
highlights a complete reversal of long-held CCP agricultural directives, and constitutes a clear
strategy with multiple layers of benefits. It is also clearly seen in the GATS export data (see
Table 2).
The primary challenge China faced was gaining a reliable source of animal feed grain
without becoming too dependent on a single outside source. However, the goal of economic selfdeterminism still checked economic aspirations. Even though corn represented the lowest cost
commodity option, the United States produced an overwhelming percentage of the global corn
supply, and it “is sometimes referred to as the Saudi Arabia of corn because it grows 41% of the
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Table 2. GATS Data of Value of US Soybean Exports in Thousands of US Dollars (19922004)110
Year
Value
1992

29,682

1993

22,999

1994

8,645

1995

50,657

1996

414,476

1997

410,554

1998

273,508

1999

358,735

2000

1,007,653

2001

1,012,486

2002

995,837

2003

2,888,772

2004

2,328,762

world’s corn and accounts for 48% of the world’s exports of corn.”111 A grain product with
multiple suppliers would give China greater independence, since if any one country attempted to
interfere in China’s sovereignty, China could simply shift purchase volumes to a different
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supplier. This is basic supply chain common sense, but the goal was not just supply and price
risk mitigation, it was high statecraft strategy focused on diplomatic self-determinism.
While the US’s industrial farm techniques had evolved to the point that it has been “the
world’s leading soybean producer since 1941,”112 Brazil had recently started growing soybeans
in significant quantities. Soybeans also have more protein by weight than corn, and “by the
bushel or by the ton are a higher value commodity than corn.”113 Economics, therefore, as well
as ensuring that if China had “any geopolitical problems with the United States,”114 it could shift
purchases to other reliable suppliers, determined China’s policy on which grain to commit to. It
is the fact that it committed to becoming a long-term customer that separates this period from
previous years.
The data in this period highlights this strategy. No longer would China purchase soybeans
as needed. It became regular a customer, and built up infrastructure and policies around this.
China lowered “import barriers for soybeans and then developed literally the world’s most
sophisticated and largest crush industry.”115 Even domestic crops were shifted to other supply
chains, as subsidies and favorability toward soy imports meant many soybean farmers in China
“switched to planting corn.”116
The secondary benefit of committing to purchase imported US soybeans was that it
publicly demonstrated China’s willingness to become a customer of the US at a time when the
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balance of payments was rapidly shifting. China’s economic reforms and industrialization had
evolved to the point that they were able to manufacture consumer goods. Western companies,
seeing the advantages of China’s significantly lower labor costs and finding welcome
encouragement from both Washington Consensus global market advocates in their own
governments, as well as China seeking to increase its exports, shifted their supply chains to
either purchase products made in China or to set up their own operations in China itself. This
“general movement toward offshoring”117 replaced a significant amount of US manufacturing.
The adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or NAFTA, in 1994 also highlights
a changing US policy, not just in North America but globally, embracing the elimination of
tariffs and allowing markets a free rein to guide supply chains.
US protective tariffs on everything from televisions to automobiles were lowered or
eliminated, allowing more affordable imports made in China to soon supplant US-made
alternatives. China was well aware that a country that imported huge volumes from one country
but exported little to nothing in return would soon resent that situation, and even NAFTA faced
such early criticisms in the US. So by committing to purchasing US soybeans, China was visibly
demonstrating to “the US government and US society that trade’s not a one-way street, that it’s
not all televisions going one way, that there are other things going the opposite”118 direction.
China wanted to make it clear that it was a reliable customer as well as a reliable supplier, and
that the relationship between the two countries could be sustained for mutual benefit.
China demonstrated this commitment with publicly signed purchase contracts. State
representatives would meet, sign documents in front of the press, and make public both the
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volumes they would purchase and their demonstration as a good customer. But only in “the first
year they did it they actually signed contracts,”119 because these contracts created market signals
that raised soybean prices. So the language of the declarations shifted to less formal, noncontractual commitments called Letters of Intention to Purchase. This allowed China to gain the
benefit of the public demonstration that they were not just selling goods to the United States but
also purchasing goods and could be a friendly trade partner, but avoided making too firm a
market signal that would create unwanted price increases. However, USDA data showed “within
three days the Chinese making commitments to purchase just about the volume”120 they’d
committed to importing during the public commitments. This makes the Letters of Intention to
Purchase not just empty gestures meant to score political points, but signs of actual economic
intent.

US Farm and Hog Industry
The industrialization of US soybean and hog farming continued the trend of fewer, larger
farms. Soybean farming increased in Missouri, due to growing export demands as well as the
continuing benefit of alternating corn and soybeans. Hog farming fully embraced CAFO
techniques, and small hog farms gradually disappeared, replaced by larger and larger facilities of
pigs who remained indoors full-time. “Bulk feeder tanks mounted outside the hog facility”121 fed
crushed soybeans to the pigs, and holes in barn floors allowed for the easy and automatic
disposal of waste and urine. The soybean supply chain grew in scale as well. The barges grew
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larger, as did the silos, and the dry-bulk grain ships bound for China became enormous. “China
became the world’s largest soybean importer in 2003,”122 but not just through market conditions.
China’s demand came partly from direct action on the part of US government and agricultural
NGO actors.

US Export of Ideas
As the US embraced CAFO techniques and chemical-based farming, Europe deliberately
shifted away from these techniques. The cost advantages of CAFO farming were clear, but also
were the quality and flavor differences in the meat, as well as the quality-of-life of the animal
and the environmental damages CAFO farms caused. All the damage from “slatted floor leg
injuries, lack of bedding, use of growth promoters and use of antibiotics has caused these
techniques to be banned in the EU.”123 China, however, embraced the US model, partly due to
US advocates.
US farming advocates and NGOs recognized the growth of soybean demand based on the
growth of CAFO hog farming techniques in the US, and realized that if China had such an
industry, the US would have an enormous customer. Beginning in the 1980s, the United States
sent experts to educate members of China’s growing hog industry on CAFO techniques, sharing
not only expertise but technology. “US corn and soybean farmers really helped China develop
that animal agriculture industry through a lot of technology transfer”124 and knowledge sharing,
with the explicit intent of creating a customer for US farmers. American farmers and traders
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profited from these investments, and China’s economy profited from the utilization of a proven
model as well as the increase in soybean and pork supplies.
Whether the European model of hog farming would have worked in China is an
interesting question, but by embracing the US’s CAFO model, China embraced and publicly
showcased its role as an enormous buyer of US grain. The GATS data shows proof of China’s
steady commitment year after year to purchase large quantities of US soybeans in this period.
More Chinese citizens gained more affluence and desired to eat more and more pork, and US
farmers grew as much soybeans as China wanted, since they don’t “care if it’s corn or soy that
the Chinese are buying as long as the Chinese are buying a crap load of it.”125
The US soon offered China Permanent Normal Trade Relations, which “became effective
upon China’s accession to the WTO in December 2001.”126 Investment and trade exploded,
while purchases of soybeans continued apace. Optimism derived from the benefits both sides of
the Pacific Ocean received hinted at no limit to the growth of their economic interdependency.
But a subtle shift in China’s strategy laid the seeds for significant challenges.
Once again, China and the US’s ultimate goals remained consistent during this period.
China wanted growth and industrialization, and the US wanted to grow foreign markets. Once
again, ideology did not interfere, and for the US, was explicitly avoided. By choosing not to use
this unique opportunity, when China was joining the world order of international trade under the
WTO, to actively promote the ideology of democracy, it was left to businesspeople to
demonstrate the superior economic outcomes of a democracy. Not only did US businesspeople
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express no interest in doing so, the lack of democracy in China in no way interfered with their
ability to grow their markets.

58

THE SOE PERIOD (2004-PRESENT)

Once China succeeded in achieving near full industrialization and put itself on a path
toward sustainable growth, its policies changed. In the Maoist period, overt governmental control
seized private property and diminished the incentives for businesses to sustain themselves.
However, a pragmatic realism had always guided the principal of “socialism with Chinese
characteristics.” With a growth in expertise and greater negotiating power in international
transactions, the CCP of the early twenty-first century sought to assert greater control over
China’s economy. But their ultimate goal still never wavered, that of growth and
industrialization. The US also never wavered in its ultimate goal of market growth. However, the
US became aware of the challenges of a more assertive China. Those motivated by ideology saw
this as a new, unexpected problem. Businesspeople who were motivated by self-interest,
however, didn’t seem to care, and in fact saw ideological conflict as acting against their own
self-interest.

State-Owned Enterprises
In 2004, a small event had massive repercussions that signaled a shift in China’s strategy
around soybeans and grain imports. A privately-owned soybean crusher in China “defaulted on
U.S. soy contracts — caught out in a price crash between their purchase contract and prevailing
prices.”127 This can happen in international trade, where the fluctuating price of commodities can
lead to massive losses if market prices fall after contract prices are locked in. However, locking
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in a price can protect against a potential price increase. Such are the risks of private exchanges,
which occur with all international trade, not just between the US and China.
The WTO and the UN have established several organizations explicitly intended to help
arbitrate and enforce decisions when such contract violations occur. In fact, acting as a court of
arbitration is perhaps the most important, and most powerful aspect of the WTO, as it regularly
“issues rulings that are universally followed even though it has no direct enforcement power.”128
Since China was now a member of the WTO, the private US company could bring the private
Chinese importer to court. For this specific case, a commodities exchange association in London
was used as a neutral arbiter, and “when U.S. traders took the Chinese crushers to arbitration at
the Grain and Feed Association in London, Chinese crushers were required to pay large sums in
compensation, forcing many of them out of business.”129
China “subsequently put in place policies and incentives to support the domestic crushing
industry with preferential financing and local government support and investments to”130 large
crushers, both state and privately owned. In addition, new, foreign-owned crushers were not
allowed to be built. The newer, state-owned mills were much larger than the older, foreignowned crushers, and could therefore negotiate for lower prices. This is essentially the philosophy
of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOE), which form “the core of China’s economic
system.”131 Setting up any industrialized business requires a significant amount of up-front
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capital. Credit limitations often mean privately-owned businesses can’t get started, or have
inefficiencies due to their small size, especially if a larger international competitor already exists.
State funds can solve this problem, and also offer some cash flow buoyancy, allowing a fledgling
business time to gain revenue while not worrying about paying off potentially high-interest loans
or appeasing investors.
Chinese SOEs have had significant success. It would be inappropriate to compare them to
state-owned communist enterprises in the Soviet Union, but they are also unlike western
European utility and transportation businesses, since “many of them behave like free-market
producers and respond to the productivity incentives of the market.”132 The major difference is
that they have the backing and financial support of the Chinese government. In the case of the
soybean crushers, it is difficult to ignore the outcomes of SOE investment and not assume intent.
The scale of the SOE crushers, such as the massive soy importer COFCO, meant that
smaller Chinese crushers could not compete. They had no choice but to buy soybeans at higher
prices, since they could not contract for the volumes of the SOEs. But American soybean
exporters did not discriminate between SOEs and private importers. Soybean suppliers sold to
whichever firm bought the largest volumes, and showed no interest in whether or not the
customer was state-owned. US soybean advocates claim that they’re “pretty much as nonpolitical as we can get, you know; we want markets,”133 nothing more and nothing less.
All these circumstances eventually led to a large amount of privately-owned soybean
crushers in China declaring bankruptcy or selling their businesses to SOEs, with the market share
of foreign-owned crushers shrinking significantly and forcing them to “work in collaboration
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with Chinese firms, both state and privately owned.”134 This shift in SOEs from inefficiently
bloated bureaucracies to “sophisticated companies,”135 along with the support strategies behind
them, clearly separates this period from the others. No longer did China seek to simply grow its
international trade, but to control it (see Table 3).

Missouri Soybean Exports
2007 was the first year GATS data separated Missouri soybean exports from the overall
national totals. The vast majority of these numbers were soybeans gathered in silos with other
states’ crops along the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers, delivered on barges to the port of New
Orleans, and exported to China in dry-bulk cargo ships. This limitation makes the above data
somewhat unreliable, since it is quite likely that any trend visible is due to poor separation of the
weight count for Missouri-grown soybeans and other states’ soybeans, since they were all
gathered at the same silos and delivered on the same ships. The national trends, by and large,
match those of the state, and are much more reliable when examining the impact of both state
and private actions in trade negotiations (see Table 4).
The trend line for soybean growth continues and shows remarkable similarity to the trend
line for China’s GDP Per-Capita growth over this same time period (see Figure 1). This
reinforces the concept that as more Chinese households gained more income for luxuries like
pork, the demand for soybeans increased. The major exception was the massive drop in US
soybean exports to China that occurred in 2018, which had a direct, political cause (see Figure
2).
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Table 3. GATS Data of Value of Missouri Soybean Exports in Thousands of US Dollars (20042020)136
Year
Value

136

2004

0

2005

0

2006

0

2007

107,434

2008

48,833

2009

981

2010

26,141

2011

23,788

2012

486

2013

0

2014

0

2015

780

2016

2,584

2017

2,952

2018

3,258

2019

0

Jan-Jun
2020

0

“Global Agricultural Trade System,” accessed August 24, 2020.
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Table 4. GATS Data of Value of US Soybean Exports in Thousands of US Dollars (20052020)137
Year
Value
2005

2,248,983

2006

2,531,853

2007

4,117,405

2008

7,259,676

2009

9,193,671

2010

10,863,827

2011

10,507,644

2012

14,877,641

2013

13,299,868

2014

14,476,293

2015

10,488,691

2016

14,202,579

2017

12,224,418

2018

3,119,229

2019

8,004,857

Jan-Jun
2019

2,945,328

Jan-Jun
2020
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1,364,254
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A New Nixon Goes to China
In 2011, Missouri and a large part of the United States was still recovering from the
2008financial crisis. Politicians saw job creation as a mandate to their election and sought export
markets to accomplish this. With its enormous economic growth and marginal penetration by US
companies, China was seen as a great opportunity for Missouri business exports, and a major
part of Governor Jeremiah ‘Jay’ Nixon’s plan for economic growth in the state. And so, the
governor carried out a trade mission to China, where “it was his goal to bring jobs to Missouri
and to increase trade from Missouri farmers.”140 Agricultural commodity representatives from
the beef, soybean, tree grower, and black walnut industries, and even Bass Pro Shops retailers
joined the expedition. While “the main purpose of governor-led trade missions is not to change
the regulatory behavior of the foreign government, but rather to secure commercial contracts for
businesses and growers within the governor’s state,”141 regulatory barriers were addressed.
The biggest challenge was the fact that US beef was barred from entry into China at this
time. This was partly due to an outbreak of disease in US cattle in 2005, but also due to the US
banning imports of Chinese cooked chicken. China wanted this ban overturned in exchange for
US beef to be allowed, and cited similar health concerns, all of which were seen as a negotiating
tactic. To Missouri farmers, Chinese regulators “use little gimmicks like health codes or this or
that to say this beef can’t come in or that beef, but really it has to do with whether or not they
want to buy your beef and it’s all strategic.”142 To overturn China’s ban on US beef without
requiring a reciprocal overturning of the US’s cooked chicken ban would be a huge political and
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economic win for Jay Nixon, but at the very least both parties sought a publicly signed economic
agreement on imports of US grain commodities. This would be similar to previously signed
Letters of Intention to Purchase, with the added publicity of a US governor being present in
China at the signing.
The state of Hebei was chosen as the destination, since Missouri and Hebei are sister
states. The governor of Hebei, Zhang Qingwei, and Missouri Governor Jay Nixon met in
Shijiazhuang following several meetings between private business representatives, where they
signed a “$200 million export and investment agreement.”143 During a press conference, while
commenting on the mutual friendship and joint economic opportunities that could be had from
trade cooperation, Zhang commented that he was concerned about terrorist activities taking place
in Missouri. A visibly flustered Jay Nixon stated that he was sure such activities would be dealt
with. Following a lunch, Governor Nixon assembled his executive team to an unscheduled
meeting that was held in a men’s restroom. There, a “fired up”144 Nixon stated that Zhang could
not tell him how to run his state.
The terrorist activity the Hebei governor referred to was in regard to the sizable amount
of Falun Gong who had settled in St. Louis, Missouri. Falun Gong is a semi-religious
organization, but past protests against the Chinese government have led them to be persecuted.
The US State Department “sharply criticizes China for its suppression of Falun Gong.”145 While
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the Hebei governor expressed a willingness to eliminate the ban on beef imports on Missouri’s
behalf during the press conference, this never came about.
John Hagler, the Missouri Director of Agriculture at the time, was present for both
meetings, and could not recall whether the Missouri governor was furious due to the Falun Gong
situation, or if he was upset about his upcoming trade mission to Taiwan, which had been
cancelled. Hagler stated that Chinese government officials, “like to let you know that they know,
that you’re not getting away with anything that they know, and if you want to continue to do
business with them there’s a certain way to do it and there’s a certain way not to do it.”146 This
private and public disapproval did not come with terms that economic opportunities were being
held hostage, or that cancelling the trip to Taiwan would ease Missouri’s exports into China. It
was feared that “the visit could ‘anger’ the Chinese government,”147 but this was never publicly
declared as the reason for the trip’s cancellation. Nevertheless, the trip was cancelled.
Government entities, employees, and NGO members certainly would have reason to
focus on the larger, political picture underlying trade. However, the actual people involved in
these negotiations, the businesspeople, the salespeople, the logisticians, bankers, etc. showed a
remarkable degree of disinterest regarding the politics of US-China trade. Data suggests that
supply chain stability, efficiency and effectiveness, and other inflationary pressures148 are their
primary decision drivers. Statistical data regarding the attitudes of private businesspeople in
exchanges implies the complete opposite, in fact, of what Modernization Theorists and their
proponents argue, that self-interest will propel developing nations to become more democratic.
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An exceptional apathy is present in this data, and is corroborated by multiple individuals.
Two such individuals are Joseph Eiger, Senior Vice President, and Josh Cherin, Vice President
of Supply Chain, at GMPC, a contract manufacturer that makes clothing for store brands and
other brands, referred to as a ‘private label’ manufacturer. Both have extensive experience in
manufacturing, and in doing business with China. Mr. Eiger has worked with apparel
manufacturers in China going back to the late nineties and has overseen operations in many other
East Asian nations. Mr. Eiger has a very politically uninterested perspective on his history there,
and has sought out Taiwanese, Cambodian, Vietnamese, Bangladeshi, and other suppliers, acting
only out of interest in finding the most capable, lowest-cost supplier, which is often not China,
due to rising labor costs. When Mr. Eiger states that “capitalism and democracy are not
intertwined,”149 he is doing so out of an abundance of experience with multiple regimes in
multiple economic and political systems.
Mr. Cherin first served as a Reuters reporter in China, and transitioned into the apparel
industry. He is passionate about the democracy issue. He was on the ground during the period of
the nineties when “the taxi drivers in Shanghai used to make 1200 renminbi ($150) or so a
month,”150 and has seen the monetary gains of Chinese citizens not lead to a desire for
democracy. Mr. Cherin claims that the freedoms Americans enjoy, from a Chinese perspective,
do not lead to a better life. In fact, high crime rates, examples of comparatively poor
infrastructure, and a general sense of anxiety and confusion over American politics, has led
Chinese citizens to not want to become like the supposed pinnacle of modernization that
America is. Mr. Cherin witnessed the perceived evolution of prosperity in China compared to

149
150

Joseph Eiger (Senior VP, GMPC) in discussion with the author, December 2020.
Josh Cherin (VP Supply Chain, GMPC) in discussion with the author, December 2020.
69

chaos in the US, and passionately laments the failure of the US to act. According to Mr. Cherin,
the opportunity to act in China was twenty years ago, when the Chinese people “were very
interested in freedom, however, the freedom to make money, and the freedom to have… a strong
social safety net to them outweighs being able to carry a gun.”151 Self-interest then, according to
Cherin, has led the Chinese people away from democracy, not toward it.
Despite his clear passions for liberty and the ability to operate as he sees fit, Mr. Cherin,
as well as Mr. Eiger, have not altered their operations based on their personal beliefs. They are
clearly able to separate their business dealings from their political views, which seems to be a
common feature of American businesspeople. These political issues did not interfere with
negotiations between private enterprises, and even the raising of such issues made conversations
“get very uncomfortable very quickly.”152 But why should American businesspeople want to
bring up these issues? They are serving their self-interest by seeking out markets and suppliers.
According to Modernization Theory, this is the very force that would propel China toward
democracy. But Mr. Cherin’s perspective is the opposite of Modernization Theory, that making
China a democracy would require an active effort on the part of the US, and perhaps even the US
government. An active effort, operating with agency, is not a natural force. Choosing to do
nothing is in itself an act of individual agency, and by doing nothing regarding the political
makeup of China, the US exercised agency, while hoping that a natural force, which did not
require agency, would operate on its own.
Self-interest, of course, works both ways in an exchange. One would not expect a
Chinese businessperson to sacrifice their own self-interest as a way of achieving a political gain
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unless they were motivated by ideology. However, if self-interest is the driver of the DMF, then
it is actually Chinese businesspeople, even more than American businesspeople, whom
Modernization Theorists would expect to see advocating for democracy.
Shirley Kwun, a self-professed “Hong Kong girl,” had much experience importing and
exporting food commodities and ingredients during her time at the Shanghai-based company
George Foods, as both a buyer and as eventual owner of the family-run business. She has hosted
dinners with traders from Spain, Japan, and the US all at the same table, all attempting to sell
George Foods their commodities. It is extremely rare to hear from a private business, whether
Chinese or American, that politics came into these discussions, since, as Mrs. Kwun put it, “both
sides are just trying to make money.”153 This does not make individuals like Mrs. Kwun apolitical actors. Far from it. Mrs. Kwun eventually married a Japanese man, and left Hong Kong
after the Chinese government’s political crackdowns of 2020. Now living in Japan, she has made
it clear that she does not want to disparage China in any way, and has no criticisms of the regime
regarding interference in her private business dealings.
Businesspeople like Mrs. Kwun and Mr. Cherin typically see regulations as a part of the
environment in which they operate, and while taxes, tariffs, even corruption and lengthy
paperwork requirements can be criticized as a barrier, a Chinese and American businessperson’s
overarching goal is always to try and make money, and such barriers exist even to the Chinese
businessperson wanting to do business in America.154 If, during a trade deal, a Chinese
businessperson such as Mrs. Kwun learned of difficult and corrupt governmental policies that
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limited their ability to make money, and that they lacked the tools to advocate for change that are
found in a democracy, Modernization Theorists propose that the DMF of self-interest would lead
them to advocate for democracy. The sum total of millions of people acting on this self-interest
would, presumably, be unstoppable in shifting China toward a democracy. And yet, this has not
happened.
Only on the governmental side were issues of democracy raised. For the most part,
private companies could continue their trade either ignorant of political discussions or only
reacting to governmental policies that affected them, such as safety regulations and tariff levels
or even intellectual property protection. Economic metrics like costs and revenues drove
business negotiations, not issues such as the Falun Gong or Taiwan or democracy.

The Rise of Xi Jinping
Xi Jinping became Party General Secretary and Chairman of the Central Military
Commission in China in 2011. Unlike his predecessors, Xi has taken a more assertive stance
when it comes to China’s foreign relations, and has shown no interest in willfully turning over
the position of President. Xi claims he’s launched a new era, concluding what he sees as China’s
three modern stages: “the standing-up stage accomplished by Mao, the growing-rich stage
achieved by Deng Xiaoping, and the becoming-strong stage that he now promised to deliver.”155
Xi repeatedly references China’s grievances of Western dominance, starting with the Opium
Wars in the mid nineteenth century, and seeks to reassert what he considers China’s rightful
place of wealth and power. In addition, Xi has shifted China’s domestic policy “from

Feng Zhang, “The Xi Jinping Doctrine of China’s International Relations,” Asia Policy 14,
no. 3 (Jul, 2019): 13.
155

72

authoritarianism to a totalitarian approach”156 in a way that has not been seen in China since
Deng or Mao.
To claim, however, that Xi is solely responsible for China not becoming a democracy is
flawed. He certainly shows no interest in adopting democracy. However, the rise of SOEs and
the trade with soybeans are not Xi’s sole responsibility, but the result of many other CCPdirected decisions. Unlike Hu Jintao, Xi’s predecessor, who openly discussed China becoming a
democracy157 while not actively pursuing it, Xi makes no such gestures of adopting a Western
model of democracy. This seems more a revealing of long-held CCP principles, rather than a
new policy directive. Even so, if Xi were solely responsible for halting China’s adoption of
democracy, it would disprove Modernization Theory, since such individual actors are thought to
be unable to have sufficient power to stop the inevitable rise of democracy.

The Trade War
One key event is visible in the GATS data. In 2018, exports of US soybeans to China
dropped 291%. This is significantly higher than any other change in export levels since China
began its strategic period of purchases, and the shift lacks any environmental or market origin.
US President Trump had promised to make adjustments to the significant trade deficit that
existed between the United States and China, and imposed tariffs on Chinese imports. In
retaliation, China added tariffs onto US exports. The “tariff rate of China on soybean imports is
shown to have severely affected the soybean trade and production between the United States and
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China,”158 and is evident in the export data. China also sought to replace any products it
purchased in the US with suppliers in other nations. The tit-for-tat raising of tariffs and efforts to
economically damage each other became commonly referred to as a Trade War.
This seems to be China’s long-term planning in the Strategic Period bearing fruit. They
didn’t have to rely on the US for all of their soybeans. They had developed a supplier
relationship with Brazil, and made efforts “at establishing large-scale agribusiness operations in
the Brazilian soybean complex and agribusiness sector.”159 However, Brazil could not
completely replace the United States. Even with the addition of Argentinian soybeans, “early
expert forecasts were that the Chinese appetite exceeded the world’s supply without the United
States,”160 and while US exports to China went down, they still existed in significant numbers.
US and Missouri soybean farmers found themselves in the unique position of being
pawns in a political game. The trade imbalance might have led to the closure of US factories,
with Chinese labor replacing American labor, but US farmers had benefited from closer
economic ties with China, and agricultural advocates had spent decades cultivating and
supporting this market. And yet, there was little push-back from farmers against the Trade War.
This was partly due to subsidies the Trump administration gave US farmers to make up for the
significant loss of their export markets. “Farmers would rather have markets than have
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payments,”161 but “they understand that China has been treating its trading partners unfairly,”162
and that other American laborers required their temporary market disruption in order to make
this happen. It is uncertain whether or not farmers would have continued to have this attitude if
the soybean market had continued to face the same level of disruption, or if they hadn’t received
payments, but they did not have to wait long.
In December 2019, President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed an
agreement intended to end the escalating trade war, or at the very least call a “truce.”163 Phases
were outlined to allow for better political and market acceptance of the changes. Phase One
included an agreement that the US would lower several of the tariffs it had imposed on Chinese
imports, and that China would commit to purchasing a significant volume of US agricultural
products. The Covid-19 Pandemic disrupted China’s commitments, but the export data suggests
that they have for the most part returned to pre-Trade War soybean import volumes, and there is
little to indicate that these numbers will not continue.
The Trade War did not accomplish its goals for the US, and it has yet to completely end.
US manufacturing did not return in significant numbers during the Trade War, nor did US supply
chains shift to non-Chinese locations.164 Cost increases brought on by the tariffs were not enough
to encourage significant change, at least in the short-term. US manufacturing still relies heavily
on imports from China, and China still relies on the US for soybeans, while its people continue
to demand more and more pork. The trade war “is still ongoing despite an interim “Phase 1”
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truce,”165 and supply chain disruptions brought on by the Covid-19 Pandemic have added further
complications.
The results of the Trade War run contrary to expectations of self-interest. If sourcing
from Chinese manufacturers suddenly became more expensive, a rational economic actor would
seek out alternative suppliers. If the Trump administration wanted to shift suppliers away from
China, they did not explicitly command them to do so. Not only would this be legally difficult in
the US, and certainly raise complaints within the WTO, but it was likely considered unnecessary.
Washington Consensus economists, in general, tend to focus on predicting behavior based on
self-interested, rational actions. Similarly, US economic policy orients around rewarding the
behavior the US wants, and providing a negative outcome for behavior it does not. In this
instance, the US made it more expensive to export products manufactured in China as a way to
direct self-interest to desirable outcomes. So why did this not happen?
US companies did not suddenly act out of something other than self-interest. The reason
so few companies left China once tariffs made manufacturing there more expensive is that
supply chains are much more complex than they appear, and raising a single cost is not
necessarily enough to shift them.166 Tariffs are certainly a cost, and self-interested companies
have made many efforts to avoid them. However, risk is also considered a cost, according to
modern supply chain management theorists. Shifting manufacturing away from China carries
many risks: risk of delays, risk of costs being higher elsewhere, and simply the risk of changing
what is already a highly complex supply chain. If, for instance, a company no longer
manufactured in China and shifted that work to US factories, and there was a delay caused by the
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training and hiring of employees, purchasing and installation of machinery, and the acquisition
of necessary materials, that delay could lead to lost sales. Customers would not receive orders,
and might purchase from a company’s competitors. Similarly, there might be quality issues, as
the new factory would potentially be unfamiliar with manufacturing the product according to
company specifications. Many companies considered the costs of these risks to far outweigh the
added costs of simply absorbing the tariffs, and either raised prices or accepting decreased, but
not terribly decreased, profits.167 This is considering that shifting manufacturing away from
China was even feasible. In many instances it wasn’t, at least in the short term, due to a lack of
capacity and a lack of knowledge or resources in certain manufacturing capabilities.168
Self-interest guided behavior during the Trade War, though not in the way the Trump
administration desired. Simply put, doing nothing cost less than doing something, and so selfinterested companies did nothing. In fact, the disruptions of the Covid-19 Pandemic have done
more to make companies reexamine their China manufacturing than the Trade War. When China
shut down whole cities and ports to contain viral outbreaks, US companies were unable to
receive finished goods and component parts made in China. These delays often meant that
factories had to shut down, creating expensive idle time, or to suffer lost sales and upset
customers. US companies saw these costs as worth the risk of finding alternative suppliers. This
did not mean either using domestic or Chinese suppliers, but “focusing on the diversification of
the supply base”169 to include a variety of global suppliers. Disruption risk, therefore, is a major
complication that modifies predictions of rational behavior, and one of many costs rational
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business decision-makers consider. Still, the main problems the Trade War attempted to address
remain largely unresolved. All the while, China has remained under autocratic rule.
The self-interest guiding business decisions only requires an ideology that benefits that
self-interest. When a change in ideology does not improve self-interest, why should it be
expected that such a change will occur? Who benefits? Neither Chinese nor American soybean
traders benefitted from introducing ideological conflict into their exchanges, even as their
governments engaged in ideological antagonism. The American trader in this period looks like a
selfish fool to Modernization Theorists, ignoring the long-term consequences of their actions.
The Chinese trader resembles a naïve, irrational fool, ignoring the potential gains to be made by
asserting the need for democracy. However, if neither saw the gain in advocating for democracy,
why should they be expected to do so? In this period, the US finally woke up to the fact that if it
wanted China to become a democracy, it would require an active, ideologically focused effort.
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THE MYTH OF THE DEMOCRATIZING MARKET FORCE

Determinism’s simplicity and predictability makes it comforting, especially when the
conclusions benefit and congratulate those developing the deterministic theory. The quasideterministic nature of Modernization Theory, and its self-congratulatory praises of US
economic and political policy, make it attractive to all sorts of Americans. However, Americans
have also shown a remarkable history of attraction toward self-interested value gain, and this
motivation would have to intersect with any force that would drive Modernization Theory. Since
it doesn’t necessarily do so, the Democratizing Market Force is a myth.

Why China Hasn’t Become a Democracy
In many ways, those who thought that raising tariff costs during a Trade War would
convince self-interested economic actors to move manufacturing away from China shared a lack
of underestimating of the complexity of the economies they were examining with Modernization
Theorists. Both inaccurately claimed that self-interest would produce a certain outcome, but
without considering the totality of the drivers of self-interest. Companies want to reduce costs,
yes, but tariffs are just one of many costs they have to consider. And China wants to develop and
grow its economy, yes, but that is far from China’s only goal. If a company did not move its
supply chain during a trade war, they were not acting irrationally. Cost drivers other than tariffs
directed their self-interest. And so, when China did not shift its political apparatus to that of a
democracy, it was either acting irrationally, or there was some self-interest Modernization
Theorists missed motivating their continued autocracy.
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The key element regarding democracy in China is simply that the CCP doesn’t want
China to become a democracy. To narrowly define China’s self-interest as being aligned with the
adoption of democracy is to not consider the myriad other priorities China has a self-interest in
addressing. China’s government has prioritized stability and growth over individual liberty.
China’s citizens seem to be comfortable with this exchange. The CCP “positioned the
government as a trustworthy partner”170 that could deliver the things that a rational member of a
capitalistic society would want, such as a stable income, leisure time, the ability to accumulate
wealth, and the ability to freely use it. What they asked in return was the loss of such liberties as
freedom of speech, judicial independence, and multi-party elections. One might argue that this is
merely the result of propaganda, characterizing the US as chaotic because of its democracy and
China as stable because of its autocracy. But rationality is not based on an objective
measurement of what is best, but on the subjective opinions of the members of the exchange.
For example, economist do not dismiss the adoption of VHS tapes in American
households as the result of propaganda. Starting in the late 1970s, technology advanced to the
point where it became economically feasible for Americans to purchase some form of home
video playing platform, with the option of choosing either VHS or Betamax. Both were “closely
comparable in cost,”171 but from a picture quality standpoint, “VHS did not have a reputation as
being superior to Beta, and the truth may indeed have been the opposite.”172 Objectively
speaking, Betamax was the obvious, rational choice. However, through a combination of
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advertising and promotion efforts, along with an intense distribution strategy,173 VHS
manufacturers convinced Americans to purchase VHS platforms. An economist would still
consider this to be rational behavior, however, because VHS advertising efforts caused
Americans to value VHS more than Betamax. Do we call these advertisements propaganda? Do
we dismiss them as evil? Economists don’t. While the connection between the rise of VHS tapes
and Modernization Theory might seem strange, it illustrates how rational it might be for
someone to make an exchange that is seemingly irrational to an outside observer.
Whether it is propaganda or not, Chinese citizens seem to be comfortable with the
exchange of democracy for stability. In essence, they value economic security and growth more
than they value liberty. They ‘give’ liberty and ‘get’ economic security. Is this not a rational
exchange? Describing it as anything but would require an ideological intrusion into a material
exchange. If this value exchange exists, then we see two self-interests at work. The first is the
ruling party. CCP members certainly see it as in their self-interest to avoid losing their
governmental authority and positions of power to a democratic challenger. Individuals also see
this as a necessary cost to give them a chance at achieving economic success. Both consumers
and the government are aligned in their fears of the disruption risks of a transition to a
democratic government. Autocracy is a cost, just like trade war-imposed tariffs. But as we have
seen with the rational actors who simply absorbed tariff costs and kept their factories in China,
disruption risk is also a cost. And so, self-interest does not universally align with democracy, and
therefore someone else would need to advocate for it, someone with ideological, rather than
material, interests.
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Proponents of Modernization Theory would argue that China will still eventually become
a democracy, that prolonged capitalistic exchanges will inevitably lead to changes, that “it’s
going to happen in degrees, it will take time,”174 but that it will happen even without “demanding
that China change.”175 There is little evidence to suggest that future economic exchanges
between American soybean exporters and Chinese importers will have any impact on China’s
democratic status. Farmers expressed more interest in selling to markets than in taking a political
position. Exporters showed no preference between state-owned or private firms. Politics seems to
have never entered the negotiating table in exchanges between private actors in the soybean
industry, even with Chinese SOEs. Individuals in these firms acted according to economic
metrics, not political ideology. And yet these are the very actors Modernization Theory proposes
will be the key drivers of delivering democracy to China.
How can politically neutral actors create a political outcome? Modernization Theory
proposes that it is through market incentives that democracy will eventually come to China. But
how can this be so if a profitable state-owned enterprise participates in that market?
Modernization Theory assumes that SOEs will inevitably fail, largely due to their reliance on
failed Soviet industries as a model. Such models do not apply to China. It is forgivable when
examining “how unsophisticated Chinese companies were thirty years ago or twenty years
ago,”176 but now Chinese SOEs are highly capable, highly sophisticated businesses. Still,
Modernization Theory doesn’t actually require the failure of an industry for democracy to
gradually take hold. It merely requires that private actors respond to incentives.
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What Modernization Theory does not allow for is the success of autocratic pushback
against democratization. The force of autocracy resisting democracy is quite evident in China.
The oppression of the Falun Gong and pushback against Missouri’s governor allowing such
followers to live freely in his state is alone evidence of China’s government putting energy
behind preventing democratic change. But Modernization Theory is almost dismissive of such
anti-democratic forces when compared to the power of the market to incentivize democratic
change. In China, it was theorized that “growth would redound to everyone’s advantage and lead
to democracy sooner or later.”177 The market is far more powerful than any autocratic effort, so
Modernization Theory proposes. The implication is that there exists a Democratizing Market
Force that can survive any autocratic resistance. But where does it come from?

The Myth of the Democratizing Market Force
Market incentives are expressed in the actions of actors participating in private
exchanges. These individuals act according to their own self-interest. The DMF proposes that
this self-interest is incentivized toward democracy due to its superior efficiency in facilitating
such exchanges.178 This mechanism is the free market, which supposedly creates the DMF. But
what if neither of the actors in such an exchange find any resistance in an autocratic society?
What if they find just as much efficiency in an autocracy as in a democracy? Such is the case in
China, with profitable SOEs, and US soybean exporters happily finding a market for their goods.
Self-interest incentives are satisfied, so how can they create a force for political change?
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Further complicating matters, self-interest is perhaps driving many of the decisionmakers in these exchanges in a different direction from democracy. If a CEO of an SOE saw
democratization as reducing their wealth, they would be self-interested in preserving the current
autocratic regime. Modernization Theorists would propose that this is irrational, since the CEO
would actually gain more wealth under a democracy, since the rule of law would protect their
financial interests. However, the reaction of US manufacturers to the 2018 Trade War proves that
risk, and the perception of risk, complicates self-interested behavior. If the CEO perceived the
risk of creating a democracy, such as allowing a new competitor to emerge, any potential bribery
or corruption they’ve likely participated in being prosecuted, or even the general unknown
turmoil that comes with any major governmental change, as being a greater cost than the
potential gains they would acquire under a democracy, then that CEO is acting rationally by not
advocating for democracy.
Modernization Theory therefore misses two important complications. First, the cultural
subjectivity related to self-interest. Second, the myriad complexities related to costs and
subjective perceptions of risk amongst all rational economic actors. To claim that China’s
differences in culture are to blame for their differences in self-interested rationality would
perhaps be dismissive and demeaning. Economics, however, do not account for such variations
in their core principals of rationality. But cultural differences in self-interest can certainly affect
behavior. To claim that a person who is willing to accept a lesser economic gain in return for
greater security is acting irrationally is to claim that US companies that did not divest from
Chinese factories due to tariffs were also acting irrationally. The point of rationality versus
irrationality is not that it follows a specific behavioral pattern, but that it is behavior that
maximizes value for the individual, and that value is entirely subjective.

84

This means that the cost of risk versus the value of gain changes depending on the
subjective perspective of the decision-maker. And so, when Modernization Theorists point out
that a system that lacks corruption creates greater wealth, this might be true, but there are rational
actors who would lose value in such a system, as well as individuals who would see changing
this system as a risk. To claim that these individuals are not acting rationally is essentially
complaining that they are not acting according to a Modernization Theory-derived definition of
rationality. Acceptance of corruption and bribery as a part of culture, perceptions of risk in
relation to individual liberty versus security, all vary in different cultures. To say that the US’s
definition of individual liberty is the only definition of rationality is not only demeaning, it
makes any theory derived from such a definition useless anywhere outside of the United States.
In essence, in order for the DMF to exist, it would require Chinese citizens to be
culturally aligned with Americans. The universalism of Modernization Theory’s proposed
definition of rationality complicates its formula. If a nation is to become a democracy, it would
either require active effort, or contextualized justifications in order to succeed. If self-interest is
the driver, then that self-interest needs to be shifted toward democracy somehow. The DMF
doesn’t naturally appear within the context of self-interest. If, however, contextualized
justifications are required, then the universalism understood to drive self-interested economic
actors toward democracy is not universal, making Modernization Theory only useful in the
analysis of nations that possess those characteristics, and useless for those that don’t.
The other requirement for the DMF to exist would be a universal self-interest in the
creation of a democracy. In fact, this is the bedrock of Modernization Theory. By examining
China’s economic exchanges, and the attitudes of its people, one can easily dismiss the idea that
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all Chinese citizens currently view democracy as in their own material self-interest.179 And if
self-interest isn’t universally guided toward democracy, then the foundations of Modernization
Theory are flawed, and the DMF is based at least partially in ideology, which Modernization
Theory dismisses as irrelevant.
With the lack of a self-interested material incentive, a gradual trend toward
democratization would require an ideological shift in China. But where would such a shift
originate if neither of the actors in a private exchange attempted to assert their ideology? In
China, “there’s not missionaries coming over there trying to spread the religion of
democracy.”180 But Modernization Theory proposes no need for such missionaries. The idea that
any ideological energy is necessary is itself a violation of Modernization Theory’s core principle.
Market exchanges and incentives alone are said to be sufficient to create an inevitable drive
toward democracy. If a natural force requires active effort, it is not a natural force. And if it is
not a natural force, then the principles of the DMF are false. The fact that any ideological effort
is at all required is enough to prove that there is no Democratizing Market Force present in SinoAmerican trade relations.

Flawed US Strategy
Modernization Theory exists not just with social scientists in economically oriented
institutions. It would be reasonable to expect those who benefitted from free trade to be
proponents of a principle that equated free trade with democratic liberalization. However,
academics, NGOs, and high-level government officials have written about, made statements
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concerning, and crafted policy around the idea “that China’s economic liberalization and the new
affluence it generated would bring political liberalization.”181
US President Clinton himself hinted at the ideology underlying Modernization Theory. In
a March, 2000 speech regarding whether or not China would succeed in its efforts to censor
democratic pressures on the internet, President Clinton said that doing so would be “like trying to
nail Jello to the wall.”182 This attitude is characteristic of US policy and Modernization
Theorists’ belief regarding China. They are almost patronizing with their dismissal of any efforts
to fight what is considered the inevitable tide of history. Now that the CCP has proven it is
perfectly capable of nailing Jello to the wall and censoring the internet, along with other modes
of free speech that might encourage grassroots democratic efforts, President Clinton’s quote
comes across as hopelessly naïve. Whether or not there is a clear written statement of this being
the US’s strategy, public sentiments like President Clinton’s are common enough to constitute a
strategy.
Throughout the trade history between the US and China, “China’s course of action has
been if anything consistent.”183 This is why the chapters of this paper are oriented around
China’s policy regarding soybeans, not US policy. There was no US soybean export strategy
beyond selling more. The CCP knows what they want from their trade with the US, and this
strategy is controlled from the highest echelons of their government. The US, however, only had
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a single intentional strategy with China, and that was to break it away from the Soviet Union.
“That very narrow goal having been accomplished early on, American purposes in developing
ties with China have yet to be clearly defined.”184 If the US could be said to have a strategy, that
strategy is intentional inaction. Chinese leaders actually encouraged this, which undoubtedly
contributed to the justification of this lack-of-a-strategy strategy.
Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that China would “need to improve the institutions for
democracy, diversify its forms and expand its channels.”185 In a 2011 luncheon in the US,
President Hu Jintao essentially outlined a Modernization Theorist’s concept of how China would
one day become a democracy. In his opinion, “The friendly exchanges between the Chinese and
American people have contributed not only to their own cultural progress, but also to the
exchanges and mutual learning between the Eastern and the Western civilizations. And they have
given a strong boost to the overall progress of human civilization.”186 This echoes the sentiment
of Missouri Governor Bob Holden, who stated that “over a period of time, I think we can move
China philosophically to our point of view and we’ll pick up and learn some things from
them.”187
These encouragements succeeded in two ways. They placated democracy advocates who
wished to see China become a democracy by assuring them that they only needed to be patient.
They also labeled any direct action to drive China toward a democracy as interventionist and
even hostile. It became thought that “you don’t change China by demanding that China change,
you change China by letting young Chinese see the value and importance of what we bring to the
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table.”188 This philosophy only makes sense if you consider democracy to be Jello. Doing
anything to it, shaking it, nailing it to the wall, has no effect, and so trying to stop it is just as
pointless as trying to push it. Direct action could only disrupt this inevitable path to democracy,
and so action was not only not required, it was actively discouraged.

The Myth of the Market as a Self-Isolated Force
A prevailing myth tangentially related to Modernization Theory is that the market alone
is sufficient to create significant political change. In the case of the soybean market, this is false.
The soybean market in the United States only exists in its current form due to significant
government, university, and NGO intervention. Researchers at universities developed agronomy
plot techniques in the early 1900s.189 Wartime government strategy drove enormous growth in
the industry, with government officials using government money to push for greater and greater
crop plantings.190 Agricultural NGOs and government agricultural advocates cultivated an export
market for soybean farmers, going so far as to educate hog farmers in China with the explicit
intention of allowing private US farmers to benefit from the creation of such a market.191
Entrepreneurial energy and responses to market signals most definitely existed to grow the
market, but its development and scale, both in the US and in China’s hog industry, are owed to
intentional non-market actions.
This idea of a market being created through intentional action is an important
clarification when examining the validity of Modernization Theory. The foundational
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understanding of this deterministic model is that no intentional action is required, that natural
responses to market incentives alone will drive change. But how can such changes be created
within a market that itself was not created through natural responses to market signals?
To insist that private individuals in the soybean market can in any way create democracy
in China is to put them into a position that they neither desire nor are capable of executing.
Government, University, and NGO actions created the arena in which private businesses operate.
Those private businesses benefit from the marketplace of the arena itself, but their actions are
confined to within “the regulatory framework”192 that the government provides. The soybean
marketplace has had a symbiotic relationship with governments, and its history shows that it
requires active maintenance and forward planning in order to create desired outcomes. How
could substantial enough a change as turning an autocracy into a democracy come about without
any intentional action?
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CONCLUSION

Two separations occurred during the history of the soybean trade between Missouri and
China: social scientists from economists, and businesspeople from governments. Economists
examined events as they were happening and sought rationales to justify this behavior.
Efficiency and effectiveness alone guided their efforts at crafting theories and disciplines that
would maximize profits, which practitioners executed with relatively little deviation, while
providing new data that economists used to continually modify their rationales. Social scientists,
however, seemed to have had a lingering desire to fit the world into a universal trend.
While Modernization Theory was not universally embraced by historians and social
scientists during this time period, it was not sufficiently criticized to be eliminated from the halls
of US statecraft. Marxist historians driven by ideology could not promote a critique that could
dismantle Modernization Theory, partly due to the loss of credibility of such ideologies after the
fall of the Soviet Union. Economists fit the past into good and bad decisions to learn lessons that
could maximize future returns, while social scientists attempted to predict the ideologies of the
future. Economists did not promote an ideological framework, simply a way of maximizing
economic return. This left an ideological vacuum, which Modernization Theory proponents
happily filled. Social scientists seemed to have assumed that economics was the primary driver
of change, and therefore associated all sorts of ideological changes with it. Economists
themselves, meanwhile, as well as economic practitioners, are not driven by ideology. In fact,
business decision-makers cite it as something that gets in the way.193 This disconnect has led to
errors, such as aligning self-interest with a Democratizing Market Force.
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The second separation is not entirely a separation, since lobbying efforts and government
involvement in businesses, especially in the soybean industry, has long been practiced and
continues to this day. However, an ideological separation exists between foreign policy decisionmakers and business decision-makers. The foreign policy of the United States is not to promote
an ideology of democracy, at least not explicitly. However, enough public comments and
decisions have been made by prominent US leaders to characterize the US as oriented toward a
pro-democracy foreign policy. If this is the goal, however, they have not communicated this with
business decision-makers. Business decision-makers do not want to be democracy evangelists, or
ideological foreign agents.194 They want to participate in value-added market exchanges. If they
were expected to promote an ideology, no one told them. The trouble is, the government seemed
to expect this to happen.
Social scientists and economists, especially businesspeople, don’t seem to communicate
terribly well. While Modernization Theory is derived from the implication that it costs more to
do business in an autocracy than in a democracy, and that therefore a democracy will inevitably
be adopted due to self-interested behavior, its proponents do not seem to have analyzed the cost
drivers that business decision-makers consider. An autocracy is supposed to create two key
inefficiencies: an inefficient allocation of resources based on a command-control economy, and
the inability to protect wealth and entrepreneurism derived from a biased, non-independent
system of law. In China’s case, the data regarding its economy allows the first to be dismissed. In
any case, its embrace of a mostly capitalistic economy makes it nothing like the communist
economy of the Soviet Union that inspired much thought regarding Modernization Theory. The
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second, however, is very much present in China, and is a key complaint of many US
businesspeople.195 However, it is simply a cost.
When making a rational exchange, business decision-makers consider the costs and
benefits. By selling and buying goods in China’s market, the benefits of hundreds of millions of
customers and the labor pool of this population are substantial. The costs include a less
developed infrastructure compared to the US, port bottlenecks, the risk of intellectual property
theft, the risk of an inability to take a non-paying customer to court and collect payment, harsh
regulations, and myriad other challenges. Modernization Theory allows for such businesses to
continue to operate in this manner, but to advocate for the cost reductions found in democracy,
since it is in their self-interest to do so.196 However, businesspeople have created several ways to
mitigate these costs.
In the case of non-payment, US businesses utilize banking guarantees like Letters of
Credit. In the case of intellectual property theft, US businesses have continued to advocate for
these to be respected by the autocratic regime, and have made substantial gains. The UN and
WTO have independent arbitration organizations that allow US and Chinese businesses to settle
disputes completely independent of either government. And regulatory compliance is a challenge
in every country, regardless of its status as a democracy. The key element is that an independent
judiciary is just one of many costs businesspeople consider when doing business in another
country. In fact, due to the many bank, UN, and WTO-based institutions that offer risk
mitigation services, businesses have effectively side-stepped the risks of doing business with an
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autocracy, or at least diminished them to the point where they are simply one of many costs to
consider.
To contemporary supply chain management professionals and logisticians, a country’s
system of law is considered a part of its infrastructure. Infrastructure, then, is not just roads and
bridges, but all parts of a nation that allow for the easy movement of goods, capital, and
information. Essentially, infrastructure is the structures that make doing business more efficient.
In the chapter on infrastructure in a contemporary International Logistics textbook, an analysis of
transportation-based infrastructure is thirty-five pages in length. An analysis of legal and
regulatory infrastructures occupies less than three pages.197 In other words, to the US
businessperson trading with a Chinese businessperson, the costs of dealing with transportation
are more substantial, challenging, and complex than dealing with China’s legal framework.
One of the key indicators of the ease of doing business in a country is the Logistics
Performance Index, developed by the World Bank. This ranking factors in transportation
infrastructure, as well as the varying banking, legal, and regulatory environments, including a
general assessment of efficiency in getting goods through customs and into the market. Germany
is ranked number one, and the US is ranked number ten. China is ranked number twenty-seven,
which is not as good, but Portugal is ranked number twenty-eight, and many other democratic
nations are ranked lower than China.198 Modernization Theorists would not propose that Portugal
adopt China’s system, and yet business professionals consider it harder to do business in
Portugal than in autocratic China. Businesses have mitigation efforts they can utilize, and other
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cost priorities than the costs of autocracy. And yet, these are the people that Modernization
Theorists claim will use their self-interest to propel China toward a democracy.
Self-interest and the DMF are not the same thing. Democratization is not in the universal
self-interest of all market participants, nor is there an inevitable trend that a significant enough
number of market participants will see democratization as in their self-interest to overcome the
self-interest of those who don’t. Self-interest is not ideologically driven. However, it can be
shaped by ideology. Propaganda can certainly change what an individual values, and therefore
change their self-interest. If the ideology of democratization was to be promoted in China
through market-based value-added exchanges, it would have required the active promotion of
that ideology within those exchanges.
With China continuing to be an autocracy while benefiting the US soybean industry, what
market signal would spur members of this industry to make any change? Some have pointed out
that China is now more democratic than it was in the past, since regional representatives act in
council much more than they used to, and this means that democratization “did occur it just
reached a limit”199 where autocratic pushback halted its progress. But this is not enough to justify
the belief that China’s path to democracy is inevitable. If an autocracy can successfully push
back against democracy while still maintaining a largely capitalistic, market-based economy, this
is a clear violation of Modernization Theory. Such deterministic theories are founded upon the
belief that rational, natural human behavior is sufficient to create significant change. But if the
change from autocracy to democracy requires strategic and intentional action, this change is not
driven by a natural force, and therefore the Democratizing Market Force is a myth, and
Modernization Theory itself is likely a myth. The natural human behavior exhibited in the
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history of the soybean trade between Missouri and China indicates that members of these
exchanges will not on their own force China to become a democracy.
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